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ABSTRACT 
 
The present studies investigated regretted actions and inactions of military Veterans.  
Utilizing a mixed methods approach, the aim of these studies was: (a) to estimate the prevalence 
and characteristics of acts of commission (actions) and omission (inactions) resulting in either 
physical or emotional harm to others; (b) gather descriptions of the events that Service Members 
consider to be acts of commission and omission; and (c) to explore Veterans’ interpretations of 
these (in)actions.  Samples of 505 (19% female) and 14 (7% female) Iraq/Afghanistan military 
Veterans participated in our questionnaire and interview studies respectively.  Questionnaire 
participants completed measures of the prevalence and interpretation of (in)actions (e.g., altered 
worldviews), psychological problems (e.g., PTSD) and combat/post-combat experience.  Interview 
participants described wartime events and how they interpreted their (in)actions over time.  We 
recruited our sample from local Veterans’ organizations and a crowdsourcing website (MTurk).   
We found that (in)actions were fairly common (49.3% reported at least one).  Service 
Members’ descriptions, interpretations, and endorsement of psychological problems differed based 
on the type of (in)action they reported.  When compared to other types of (in)actions, acts of 
commission resulting in physical harm to others (Commission-Physical) had distinct characteristics 
with regards to context (e.g., most likely to occur during combat), outcome (e.g., only depicted 
harm to non-Service Members), interpretation (e.g., least likely to be regretted) and psychological 
outcomes (e.g., when regretted, Commission-Physical actions were most-strongly associated with 
PTSD).   Different types of (in)actions also appear to be associated with alterations to Service 
Members’ worldviews in different ways (e.g., whether changes occur to one’s conceptualization of 
oneself vs. others/the world).  Altered worldviews was also the only interpretation variable that 
predicted psychological problems independently of other interpretation variables (e.g., guilt/shame) 
when other factors were accounted for (e.g., age, combat experience).   
  
iii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 
 
CHAPTER 2: STUDY ONE .............................................................................................................. 12 
 
CHAPTER 3: STUDY TWO ............................................................................................................. 28 
 
CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................. 64 
 
TABLES ............................................................................................................................................. 77 
 
FIGURES ........................................................................................................................................... 80 
 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................... 83 
 
  
1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Although many military personnel and veterans demonstrate negligible psychological 
distress following high-stress military operations, a sizeable proportion experience a range of 
mental health and adjustment difficulties during their service and post-deployment (e.g., Hoge, 
Auchterlone, & Miliken, 2006; Ramchand et al., 2010).   Among the most common mental 
health difficulties within the military population is post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Weiss 
et al., 1992; Hoge et al., 2004).  Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), researchers have estimated that approximately 15% of 
returning veterans require treatment for PTSD (costing an estimated $200 million yearly in 
healthcare expenses; Harrison et al., 2010).  
Among the various theories proposed to explain the etiology of PTSD, most (but not all) 
of the theoretical explorations of PTSD have focused on fear (Gillihan, Cahil, & Foa, 2014).  
One theory that has shaped many investigations and PTSD treatments is Foa and Kozak’s (1986) 
cognitive processing theory.  Cognitive processing theory proposes that specific pathological fear 
structures underlie PTSD.1  Further, two of the four strongly recommended treatments proposed 
by the APA’s Guideline Development Panel for establishing clinical practice guidelines for the 
treatment of PTSD  (cognitive processing therapy (CPT) and exposure therapy (PE)) are based, 
in large part, on Foa and Kozak’s (1996) proposal that effective psychosocial intervention 
requires modification of the pathological elements of the victim’s fear structure (Courtois et al., 
2016). 
                                                 
1 Foa and Kozak’s (1986) framework for explaining fear structures is based largely on Lang’s (1977) bio- 
informational theory proposing that fear is represented in memory as a structure that includes representations of 
feared stimuli, fear responses, and the meaning of these stimuli and responses.  According to this theory, a traumatic 
memory can be distinguished from other memories by the presence of a large number of stimulus representations 
associated with danger and by particularly strong response elements. 
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Though much of the theory and investigation pertaining to PTSD has focused on post-
traumatic fear structures, some researchers have also noted strong associations between moral 
emotions (e.g., guilt and shame) and PTSD symptom severity (e.g., Fontana, Rosenheck, & 
Brett, 1992).  Though guilt was included as one of the original symptoms when PTSD was first 
included in the DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 3rd ed., 1980), early research with 
military veterans considered guilt narrowly as an irrational belief about surviving when others 
did not survive (Opp & Samson, 1989).  However, subsequent researchers have noted that guilt 
and shame are not only associated with the threat to one’s own survival or the survival of other 
unit members, but also events in which survival was not threatened (e.g., Kubany, Abueg, 
Kilauano, Manke, & Kaplan, 1997; Leskela, Dieperink, & Thuras, 2002).   For example, military 
personnel serving in war are confronted with a variety of ethical and moral challenges that may 
transgress deeply held beliefs or integral rules/codes of behavior (Solomon, Mikulincer, & 
Hobfoll, 1987).  Essentially, many servicemen and servicewomen are not only victims but are 
also perpetrators of threatened harm and violence.   
Recognizing the growing body of work focusing on guilt/shame and acts committed by 
military members that harm others, Litz and et al. (2009) proposed a new term, moral injury, to 
describe the association between Service Members’2 psychological maladaptation and their 
perceived responsibility for inflicting violence on others.   Defined as “perpetrating, failing to 
prevent, bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and 
expectations,” (Litz et al., 2009, p. 699) moral injury research has explored the repercussions of 
actions people take (e.g., killing someone) that go against one’s moral beliefs and/or code about 
what is right and wrong (e.g. Finley, 2011; Van Winkle & Safer, 2011).  Prior research among 
                                                 
2 This spelling/punctuation and usage is utilized as recommended by the Writing Style Guide and Preferred Usage 
for Department of Defense (2016, March 28) Issuances. 
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military veterans offers support for the concept of moral injury (e.g., Fontana & Rosenheck, 
1999).  For example, investigators have found that acts resulting in harming others are associated 
with higher rates of psychological problems (e.g., Flipse Vargas, Hanson, Kraus, Drescher, & 
Foy, 2013).  Interest in moral injury has been increasing rapidly.  In particular, the literature on 
moral injury has increased over the last half-decade (a PsycINFO search for moral injury from 
January 2010 to the present returned 247 citations, up from 117 in the preceding ten-year 
period).    
Despite considerable growth in the moral injury literature, it continues to have 
considerable limitations (Frankfurt & Frazier, 2016).  First, acknowledging that the duties and 
responsibilities of military service members within a combat setting increase the likelihood that 
they will cause harm to others, moral injury investigations have focused on acts committed by 
military personnel (e.g., killing; Maguen et al., 2010).  However, acts of omission (we define 
these as failing to prevent harm to others when they believe they should have done so) may also 
be an important predictor of psychological problems.  Consistent with this conjecture, Fontana 
and Rosenheck (2004) found that failure actions (e.g. failing to fulfill duties, inability to save the 
wounded) positively predicted psychological problems among Vietnam and Korea-era veterans.  
Another limitation of moral injury research so far has been the narrow focus on Service 
Members’ interpretation that they broke their own rules of right and wrong.  Research suggests 
that other interpretations may be important as well.  For example, findings that individuals who 
have greater difficulty reconciling the meaning of potentially traumatic wartime events tend to 
have greater PTSD symptoms (e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000) suggest that violations and alterations 
to Service Members’ worldviews (e.g., alterations to one’s conceptualization of oneself, others, 
and/or the world) may also be related to moral injury.  First-hand accounts from OEF/OIF 
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veterans have also revealed individual differences among Service members’ justifications for 
wartime actions (e.g., Grossman, 2009).  Correspondingly, while many veterans express some 
remorse in relation to Morally Injurious Events (MIEs) they also report that they did what they 
had to do to survive (e.g., Currier, McCormick, & Drescher, 2015). Thus, another interpretation 
that may be associated with moral injury is the extent to which Military personnel judge their 
actions or inactions (hereafter: [in]actions) as appropriate (e.g., because they were following the 
orders of their superiors, doing their duty, or doing what they had to do to stay alive; Gray, 1998; 
Shay, 1995). 
The final limitation concerns the psychological problems investigated by moral injury 
researchers.  Based, in large part, on studies that have consistently found that greater combat 
(e.g., incoming fire, killing) and post-combat (e.g., seeing dead bodies) exposure is associated 
with greater severity of PTSD (e.g., MacNair, 2002), moral injury researchers have theorized that 
Service Members reporting acts that resulted in harm to others would also endorse higher levels 
of PTSD (Litz et al., 2009).  However, other psychological problems that have been linked to 
wartime experiences, such as depression (Kim, Thibodeau, & Jorgensen, 2011), suicidal ideation 
(Bryan, Morrow, Etienne, & Ray-Sannerud, 2013), and alcohol use (Wilk et al., 2010), have 
largely been ignored by moral injury researchers.   
Endeavoring to address these limitations (i.e., lack of exploration of actions and inactions 
as well as the narrow/limited focus of interpretations and psychological problems associated with 
MIEs) within the moral injury literature, Williams and Berenbaum (in review) conducted an 
initial, small-scale (n = 50) exploratory investigation.  Findings from this study offered evidence 
that acts of omission are important. For example, whereas both acts of commission and omission 
were significantly associated with psychological problems, only acts of omission continued to 
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predict both PTSD and depression/suicidality when accounting for age, gender, and the 
combined combat/post-combat experiences of their Service Member sample.  Thus, Williams 
and Berenbaum’s findings also offer support for the relationship between MIEs and other 
psychological problems beyond PTSD (i.e., depression/suicidality).   
The Williams and Berenbaum (in review) study also found noteworthy evidence 
suggesting that altered worldviews are important.  Whereas both altered worldviews and the 
perception of breaking one’s rules of right and wrong were associated with PTSD and 
depression/suicidality, only altered worldviews continued to be significantly associated with 
PTSD and depression/suicidality after taking into account age, gender, and combined 
combat/post-combat experiences.   Moreover, higher levels of both acts of commission and 
omission were associated with higher levels of breaking one’s rules of right and wrong and 
altered worldviews.  Interestingly, however, perceptions of appropriateness (e.g., “Given the 
circumstances, my actions/inactions were appropriate”) were associated differently with acts of 
commission (the more that participants rated an act of commission the more they endorsed 
appropriateness) than with acts of omission (the more that participants rated an act of omission 
the less they endorsed appropriateness).  Unexpectedly, Service Members’ perceptions of the 
appropriateness of their (in)actions were not associated with any of the psychological problems 
that were measured (PTSD, depression/suicidality, and alcohol use).   
Given that the Williams and Berenbaum (in review) study was the first to suggest the 
potential importance of acts of omission, altered worldviews, a major aim of this dissertation was 
to determine if the findings from the exploratory study could be replicated.  This project also 
sought to extend the findings of Williams and Berenbaum (in review) by exploring the 
unexplained or surprising results in greater detail while also addressing a number of the initial 
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study’s limitations.  First, though the Williams and Berenbaum (in review) study offered 
evidence suggesting that both acts of commission and omission were fairly common among 
OEF/OIF veterans (67% reported an act of commission, act of omission, or both), the sample 
size (N = 50) was insufficient to make any claims of prevalence for the military population more 
generally. Hence, one aim of this project was to gain a better estimate of the prevalence of 
actions and inactions among military Service Members.   
 One limitation of Williams and Berenbaum’s (in review) study was the somewhat vague 
definitions of both acts of commission and omission.  The initial study asked two questions 
concerning actions, (e.g., “What I did caused substantial physical harm to another person”) and 
only one question concerning acts of omission (“I feel like there was something I could have 
done but did not do it”).   For this project, we asked two questions concerning both commission 
and omission.  We also reworded and expanded questions to more clearly define the criteria of 
an (in)action.  Specifically, we asked about (in)actions that led to “substantial” (a lot) and 
“lasting” (more than one week) harm to others.  Next, based on interviews among Service 
Members revealing that, though many MIEs likely result in physical harm to others, (in)actions 
can also result in other types of harm (Currier et al., 2015), we asked Service Members whether 
their (in)action(s) resulted in physical harm and/or emotional harm to others, see (in)action 
questions below).   
To further expand our investigation of (in)actions, we considered a number of additional 
characteristics/outcomes.  Accounts of Service Members’ wartime events have illustrated that 
Veterans often differ in the level of regret they associate with their wartime experiences (Sites, 
2013).  We hypothesized that regret might be one feature that distinguishes different (in)actions 
(e.g., Service Members may endorse greater regret for acts of omission resulting in emotional 
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harm to others than for acts of commission resulting in emotional harm to others).  Based on the 
higher correlations between acts of omission and psychological problems (when compared to 
acts of commission) found by Williams and Berenbaum (in review), we hypothesized that 
Service Members would endorse overall higher scores of regret for acts of omission.  Further, 
accounts of Service Members’ wartime experiences (e.g., Grossman, 2009, Shay, 2003) suggest 
that (in)actions may differ based on whether Service Members report: (a) the (in)action occurred 
during a combat scenario, (b) whether the Service Member believes they were doing their duty 
during the incident, and (c) whether the Service Member believes that their (in)action contributed 
to the success of their unit’s mission.  We hypothesized (based on Service Members’ accounts; 
e.g., Sites, 2013) that participants would be more likely to endorse all three of the additional 
characteristics/outcomes for acts of commission than for acts of omission. 
 In addition to extending Williams and Berenbaum’s (in review) findings to determine if 
(in)actions differ based a variety of characteristics/outcomes, we also explored whether we could 
replicate the findings that some interpretations associated with Service Members (in)actions (i.e., 
altered worldviews) were more strongly associated with psychological problems than other 
interpretations (e.g., breaking one’s rules of right/wrong).  Indeed, Williams and Berenbaum (in 
review) found that altered worldviews were not only stronger at predicting PTSD and 
depression/suicidality than breaking one’s rules of right/wrong, but even predicted psychological 
problems above and beyond guilt and shame (emotions which, as noted above, have long been 
documented as important contributors to psychological problems among military personnel, e.g., 
Leskela, Keperink, & Thuras, 2002).    
This dissertation also sought to determine if the unexpected findings related to 
appropriateness would replicate while exploring additional features that might clarify and expand 
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our understanding of how Service Members interpret the appropriateness of their (in)actions.  
Though Williams and Berenbaum (in review) found that perceived inappropriateness was 
associated with both acts of commission and omission, they did not find strong associations 
between participants’ perceived inappropriateness and psychological problems.   It may be, 
therefore, that Service Members’ perceptions of the inappropriateness of their (in)actions may be 
more complicated than other interpretations.  Among the possible considerations that may shape 
Service members’ judgements of appropriateness is the presence of others during their 
inaction(s).  One reason that the presence of others may influence a Service member’s 
interpretation of the appropriateness of their (in)actions may be found in investigations that have 
proposed that atrocities performed as a group are typically evaluated as a group (e.g., Shay, 
2003).   Similarly, Bandura (1999) has argued that atrocities that are perpetrated by a group of 
individuals allows for a removal of self-blame through sharing or diffusing responsibility among 
other group members (i.e. division of labor) and/or dehumanization of the enemy (i.e. 
euphemistic language).   
Another factor that may shape judgments of appropriateness is whether Service Members 
perceive they are protecting others through their (in)action(s). Grossman (2009) noted that, 
among military veterans who reported using deadly force against an enemy combatant, those 
who perceived that they were protecting other members of their unit family endorsed their 
actions as appropriate, albeit undesired, in order to protect the members of their unit family. By 
contrast, violent force against unarmed civilians was perceived as inappropriate. Other 
investigators have reported that veterans often describe their actions as the “lesser of two evils” 
when they report using deadly force in order to protect the members of their unit family (e.g., 
Lazar, 2013).  Yet, here too, it may be that Service Members perceived their (in)actions were 
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protecting other Service Members that were not a member of their unit or non-Service members 
(e.g., civilians).  Thus, this dissertation explored whether Service Members’ judgement of 
appropriateness might be influenced by either the presence of others or the perception that they 
were protecting others (or both).   
Though Williams and Berenbaum (in review) found relationships between psychological 
problems and both acts of commission and omission, surprisingly little research has attempted to 
determine what events and/or scenarios Service Members’ consider when investigators ask about 
wartime actions and/or inactions.  Though studies have explored differing wartime experiences 
among deployed veterans, these studies have focused on acts of commission.  For example, Hoge 
et al. (2004) found that 77% of their sample of veterans from Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF; Afghanistan) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) had fired their weapon at the enemy, 
48% reported being responsible for the death of an enemy combatant, and 28% reported being 
responsible for the death of a noncombatant.  Qualitative research with Service Members also 
supports the need for understanding Service Members’ experiences in greater detail and suggests 
that Service Members (in)actions are likely varied, diverse, and complex.  For example, studies 
that have asked either veterans (Flipse Vargas et al., 2013) or clinical professionals (Drescher et 
al., 2011) to depict, in detail, the MIEs they have experienced, witnessed, or heard have revealed 
that Service Members consider both “direct” experiences (e.g., firing one’s weapon resulting in 
the death on an enemy combatant) as well as “indirect” forms of exposure (e.g., witnessing other 
Service Members actions that resulted in physical harm to others).   
Given the current lack of clarity concerning which experiences Service Members endorse 
as acts of commission and/or omission, and what kinds of (in)actions result in physical and/or 
emotion harm to others, we employed a mixed methods approach.  Whereas researchers have 
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long considered qualitative and quantitative models of inquiry to represent two mutually 
exclusive conceptual paradigms, mixed methods research (MMR) judges this either/or mentality 
as “too narrow” given the overarching aims of many research endeavors and the limitations of 
scientific knowledge more generally (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  Thus, MMR argues for a 
wide range of methodologies and concepts that can bridge the space between the extremes of 
deductive and inductive epistemology that might address the weaknesses of any one research 
methodology (in isolation) and allow researchers to more thoroughly investigate phenomena of 
interest (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2010).  Correspondingly, noting the diversity and complexity of 
Service Members’ wartime experiences, this project sought to explore the viewpoints of Service 
Members both through qualitative measures and qualitative interviews.  Thus, the aim of using 
MMR in this study was to achieve complementarity (or a broader, deeper, and more 
comprehensive social understanding that taps into different facets or dimensions of a 
phenomenon) in order to more fully assess and understand the various facets, dimensions and 
definitions of Service Members’ (in)actions (Greene, 2007; Lee and Greene, 2007).    
Finally, to explore Service Members’ (in)actions in greater depth and detail, this 
dissertation project also used qualitative interviews to investigate how Service Members’ 
interpretations form and if/how interpretations change over time.  Though researchers have noted 
that individuals commonly change their interpretations of actions they regret (e.g., Ratcliffe, 
2008), this research has not been conducted with Service Members.  We thought it would be 
likely for Service Members’ interpretations to change over time as well.  For example, a Service 
member may initially perceive that harming an enemy combatant is acceptable and dutiful, but 
then later (e.g., after leaving the military) feel some regret. Thus, this dissertation investigated 
how each of the following may change over time: (a) whether the (in)action is regretted; (b) 
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perceptions of the appropriateness of their (in)actions; (c) perceptions that their (in)actions broke 
their own rules of right and wrong; and (d) the impact of their (in)action(s) on their worldviews.   
To summarize, the major goals of this dissertation were: (a) estimate the prevalence of 
Service members’ (in)actions; (b) determine whether Service Members’ levels of regret differ 
based on the type of (in)action they report; (c) explore whether Service Members further 
differentiate (in)actions based on: (1) whether their (in)action occurred during combat; (2) 
whether they were doing their duty during the (in)action; and (3) whether their (in)action 
improved the likelihood of success of their unit’s mission; (d) explore whether the strong 
associations between altered worldviews and psychological problems (found by Williams and 
Berenbaum (in review)) would replicate; (e) investigate whether the presence of others and/or 
Service members’ perception of protecting others are associated with their perceptions of 
inappropriateness; (f) investigate whether the presence of others and/or Service members’ 
perception of protecting others influence (moderate) the association between appropriateness and 
psychological problems (PTSD, dysphoria, and alcohol/substance use);  (g) through qualitative 
interviews (using a mixed methods approach), gather descriptions of the events that Service 
members consider to be acts of commission and omission; (h) investigate how Service members’ 
interpretations of regretted (in)actions that occurred in their roles as Service members change 
over time, specifically regarding: (1) whether the (in)action is regretted; (2) perceptions of the 
appropriateness of their (in)actions; (3) perceptions that their (in)actions broke their own rules of 
right and wrong; and (4) the impact of their (in)action(s) on their worldviews.   
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CHAPTER 2: STUDY ONE 
 
The major goals of Study one was to: (a) estimate the prevalence of Service members’ 
(in)actions; (b) determine whether Service Members’ regret scores differ based on the type of 
(in)action they report; (c) explore whether Service Members further differentiate (in)actions 
based on: (1) whether their (in)action occurred during combat; (2) whether they were doing their 
duty during the (in)action; and (3) whether their (in)action improved the likelihood of success of 
their unit’s mission; (d) explore whether the strong associations between altered worldviews and 
psychological problems (found by Williams and Berenbaum (in review)) would replicate; (e) 
investigate whether the presence of others and/or Service members’ perception of protecting 
others are associated with their perceptions of inappropriateness; (f) investigate whether the 
presence of others and/or Service members’ perception of protecting others influence (moderate) 
the association between appropriateness and psychological problems (PTSD, dysphoria, and 
alcohol/substance use).  
Methods 
Recruitment 
We recruited the majority of participants (94.7%) through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) online data collection tool/resource.  We recruited the remaining participants via emails 
to veteran organizations (e.g., Student Veterans of America, Veterans of Foreign Wars) and 
organizations that typically have a high proportion of veterans (e.g., training facilities for local 
and state police).  MTurk is a crowdsourcing resource designed to assist with data collection 
within the context of an open online marketplace (see Shapiro & Chandler, 2013).  Psychological 
researchers have found that MTurk participants are slightly more demographically diverse than 
other student samples and are significantly more diverse than American college student samples 
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(e.g., Buhrmester, Kwant, & Gosling, 2011).  In addition, researchers have determined that 
MTurk participants can be a fruitful resource for recruiting specific populations (e.g., military 
Service Members) rapidly and relatively inexpensively without compromising data quality and 
integrity (e.g., Bartneck, Duenser, Moltchanova, & Zawieska, 2015; Lynn & Morgan, 2016).   
Procedure 
Recruitment communications (whether email or through the MTurk website) contained a 
link that forwarded participants to the questionnaires (via Qualtrics). After completing the 
consent process, participants then confirmed that they had participated in at least one 
OEF/OIF/OND deployment (the only inclusion criterion).  Participants then answered a series of 
screening questions (e.g., “match the rank titles to their respective insignia,” “in what state was 
your basic training base located?”) designed (e.g., utilizing military veteran focus groups) and 
validated (e.g., by using both veteran and nonveteran samples) to verify the military background 
of an online sample (Lynn & Morgan, 2016).  Similar to previous research, we found that that a 
large proportion (63.7%) of individuals who accessed the online questionnaires did not proceed 
past the military verification screening questions (Lynn & Morgan, 2016).  Participants who 
completed all of the questionnaires viewed a screen thanking them for their participation and a 
randomly generated code that they entered into the MTurk website for to verify their 
participation.  A member of the research team verified that participants: (1) answered at least 7 
of the 8 military verification questions correctly; (2) did not answer the questions too quickly3  
nor use the same answer throughout the questionnaires (e.g., answer “Completely Disagree” for 
                                                 
3 The first 16 participants were active-duty military personnel who completed the questionnaires in the presence of a 
member of the investigation team.  Their responses were timed to determine how much time, on average, 
participants would need to complete all of the questionnaires (M = 14 minutes 20 seconds, SD = 5 minutes 41 
seconds).  We also utilized this information to determine a minimum time limit.  Since the quickest responder 
completed the questionnaires in 7 minutes and 6 seconds, we discarded the responses of participants who completed 
the questionnaires in less than 7 minutes.   
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all questions of all questionnaires). A member of the research team then flagged participants’ 
MTurk IDs to prevent the same individuals from participating more than once.4  MTurk 
participants who met all of the verification criteria were then confirmed in the MTurk website 
and received reimbursement via MTurk’s compensation system.  We reimbursed non-MTurk 
participants (who also met all of the verification criteria) with a gift card.  
Participants began the questionnaire portion of the study by answering a set of questions 
asking about their actions and inactions during their deployment(s) (described below).  
Participants then read instructions asking them to consider a specific event or series of events 
that caused them regret.  The instructions specified that the event could be something they did 
(e.g., causing considerable harm to another person) or did not do (e.g., not helping someone in 
need).  The instructions asked participants to reflect on this event(s) when answering the 
remaining questions (also described below).   
Participants 
 Figure 1 shows the number of participants who: (a) accessed the questionnaires; (b) 
stopped at the military verification questions; (c) completed the questionnaires but did not 
answer the verification questions; and (d) completed the questionnaires but answered too quickly 
or used the same response throughout the questionnaires.  Our final sample consisted of 505 
military OEF/OIF Service members (19.0% female) who ranged in age from 19 to 63 (M = 33.9, 
SD = 7.6).  The majority (69.2%) were European American with 14.1% African American, 
10.1% Latinx, 4.4 % Asian American, and 2.2 % American Indian.  Our sample included Service 
members from all of the five branches (50.1% Army, 21.2% Air Force, 14.3% Marines, 13.9% 
Navy, and 0.6% Coast Guard) and both active duty (80.3%) and Reserve/National Guard 
                                                 
4 MTurk utilizes a multi-phase process to verify that each worker ID corresponds to a unique person.  Thus, an 
individual cannot acquire multiple MTurk IDs in order to participate in the same study multiple times. 
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components (19.7%) of the U.S. Armed Forces.  The only inclusion criterion for participation in 
this study was at least one (M = 1.8, SD = 1.2) OEF/OIF era deployment. 
Materials 
Acts of Commission and Omission   
Two items modified5 from the Moral Injury Events Scale (MIES, Nash et al., 2013) 
measured acts of commission.  One question measured physical acts of commission (“Another 
person suffered substantial (a lot) and lasting (more than 1 week) physical harm as a result of 
something I did”) and one question measured emotional acts of commission (“Another person 
suffered substantial (a lot) and lasting (more than 1 week) emotional harm as a result of 
something I did”).  Items were rated dichotomously (“Yes” or “No”).  Two items, modified from 
the MIES (Nash et al., 2013) measured acts of omission.  One question measured physical acts of 
omission (“Another person suffered substantial (a lot) and lasting (more than 1 week) physical 
harm as a result of something I did not do”) and one question measured emotional acts of 
omission (“Another person suffered substantial (a lot) and lasting (more than 1 week) emotional 
harm as a result of something I did not do”).  Items were rated dichotomously (“Yes” or “No”).   
Regret and additional characteristics/outcomes of (in)actions   
When participants answered yes to any of these four commission/omission questions, 
they answered four additional questions that explored regret and additional 
characteristics/outcomes of the (in)action(s).  The first question (“I feel some regret as a result of 
what I did”) asked participants to rate the regret they felt associated with the (in)action (on a 
                                                 
5 We modified items based on recommendations identified by Frankfurt and Frazier (2016) who noted that questions 
from the MIES (e.g., “I feel guilt over failing to save the life of someone in the war”) tend to confound exposure to 
transgressive acts (“I failed to save the life of someone”) with the effects of exposure (“I feel guilt”).  Thus, we 
asked questions exploring acts of commission and omission separately from questions exploring the possible effects 
of Service Members’ (in)actions. 
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scale from 1 = “Strongly Disagree” to 5 = “Strongly agree”).  The next three questions explored 
additional characteristics/outcomes of the (in)action, including whether the (in)action:  (a)  
occurred during combat (“This event occurred during a combat or operational incident”); (b)  
occurred in conjunction with doing the participant’s duty (“During this event I was doing my job 
or duty”); and/or (c) increased the likelihood of success (“I believe my actions improved the 
likelihood of the success of my unit’s mission”). All three of the additional 
characteristics/outcomes questions were measured categorically (“Yes” or “No”). 
Broke rules of right/wrong   
Two items, modified from the MIES (Nash et al., 2013), examined participants’ judgment 
of whether (in)actions broke an internal moral code (“What I did and/or did not do betrayed my 
personal values” and “During this event, I broke my own rules of right and wrong”).  These 
items were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = “Strongly Disagree”; 5 = “Strongly Agree”). Scores on 
the two items were strongly correlated (r = .45, p < .001).  
Appropriateness   
Two items examined participants’ beliefs that their actions were appropriate 
(“Considering the circumstances, my actions/inactions were reasonable” and “My actions in this 
event were appropriate given the circumstance”).  These items were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = 
“Strongly Disagree”; 5 = “Strongly Agree”).  Scores on the two items were strongly correlated (r 
= .56, p < .001).   
Altered worldviews   
Six items (α = .83) of the Stressful Life Experiences Scale (ISLES; Holland, Currier, 
Coleman, & Neimeyer, 2010) (e.g., “My understanding of how the world works has never been 
the same since this event”, “Since this event, my beliefs in what is right and wrong have 
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changed”) examined participants’ reports of the degree to which their perceptions of themselves, 
others, and the world had changed in response to their (in)action(s).  Items were rated on a 5-
point scale (1 = “Strongly Disagree”; 5 = “Strongly Agree”).  The items were altered slightly, 
asking participants to think of one specific events or series of events when considering their 
answer. 
Guilt/Shame   
Five items (α = .72) used in past research (e.g., Thompson & Berenbaum, 2006), 
measured guilt (e.g., “I wish I could ‘make things right”) and shame (e.g., “I believe that I am a 
bad person”). Items were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = “Strongly Disagree”; 5 = “Strongly 
Agree”).   
Presence of Others/Protecting Others   
One question, developed by the authors, asked whether others were present at the time of 
the event (“Other people were present when this event occurred.”). One question, developed by 
the authors, asked whether the participant was protecting others during the event (“During this 
event, I was protecting others).  Both items were rated dichotomously (“Yes” or “No”). 6 
Combat and post combat experience   
The 17-item (α = .95) Combat Experiences subscale of the Deployment Risk and 
Resilience Inventory (DRRI-2; Vogt et al., 2013) explored combat (e.g., “I went on combat 
patrols or missions”). The 13-item (α = .94) Post-Battle Experiences subscale of the DRRI-2 
(Vogt et al., 2013) explored post-combat experiences (e.g., “I saw the bodies of dead civilians”).   
                                                 
6  Though we did ask participants to indicate different kinds/types of people who were present and/or being 
protected (other Service Members in one’s unit, other Service members not in one’s unit, and other non-Service 
Members (e.g., civilians)) there was no statistical difference between the different kinds/types of others present 
and/or protected.  
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The DRRI-2 has demonstrated strong internal consistency and criterion-related validity (Vogt et 
al., 2013).  Items were rated on a 6-point scale (1 = “Never; 6 = “Daily or almost daily”). 
PTSD   
PTSD symptoms over the past month were measured using the 20-item (α = .97) PTSD 
Checklist for DSM-5 (PCL-5; Weathers et al., 2013).  PCL-5 items reflect both changes to 
existing symptoms and the addition of new symptoms in DSM-5 (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Items were rated on a 5-point scale (0 = “Not at all”, 4 = “Extremely”).  The 
PCL-5 has very good internal consistency and correlates strongly with other measures of PTSD 
symptoms (Dickstein et al., 2015).  Overall, our sample reported high scores (M =  39.1, SD = 
18.3); the recommended cut-off for PTSD in a Veteran sample is 33 (Bovin et al., 2016). 
Dysphoria   
Symptoms of dysphoria over the past two weeks were measured using the 10-item (α = 
.95) dysphoria subscale of the Inventory of Depression and Anxiety Symptoms (IDAS; Watson 
et al., 2007).  The dysphoria subscale (e.g., “I felt depressed” and “I felt inadequate”) of the 
IDAS has shown strong internal consistency, convergent and discriminant validity with 
psychiatric diagnoses and self-report measures; and short-term test–retest reliability within both 
community and psychiatric patient samples (Watson et al., 2007). Items were rated a 5-point 
scale (1 = “not at all”, 5 = “extremely”).  Overall, our sample reported average scores (M = 20.7, 
SD, 9.6) in comparison to community samples of adults (Watson et al., 2007). 
Alcohol and Substance Use   
The frequency (how often) and quantity (how much) of alcohol use was measured using 
the three item (α = .81) Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test (AUDIT-C; Saunders, Aasland, 
Babor, De la Fuente, & Grant, 1993). Each question of the AUDIT-C utilizes a unique 4-point 
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response scale. The AUDIT-C has sound validity and internal consistency, even when used in 
different settings and populations (Reinert & Allen, 2007).  The frequency of substance use other 
than alcohol (e.g., tobacco, marijuana) during the past two weeks was measured using the 11-
item (α = .86) Alcohol Smoking and Substance Involvement Screening Test modified by the 
National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA-Modified ASSIST; National Institute on Drug Abuse, 
2012).  The NIDA-Modified ASSIST has demonstrated good or excellent test-retest reliability 
and has shown sound validity in terms of DSM-5 diagnostic assessment for substance use 
disorders (Humeniuk et al., 20-8).  Items were rated a 5-point scale (1 = “not at all”, 5 = “Nearly 
every day”).   Given the high correlation between alcohol and other substance use (r = .43, p < 
.001), we computed a single “Alcohol and Substance Use” composite score by combining the 
scores from the alcohol and substance use measures.  Overall, our sample reported somewhat-
risky alcohol use (M  = 3.3, SD = 2.9; Bush, Kivlahan, McDonell, Fihn, & Bradley, 1998) and 
low-to-moderate substance use (M  = 6.1, SD = 8.3; WHO ASSIST Working Group, 2002). 
Results 
Characteristics of (In)actions 
 We began by exploring the prevalence of endorsed (in)actions.  Roughly half (49.3%) of 
our sample reported at least one type of (in)action.  The most common type of reported 
(in)actions were committed acts resulting in emotional harm to others (Commission-Emotional; 
34.2%) followed by acts of commission that resulted in physical harm to others (Commission-
Physical; 29.7), omitted acts resulting in physical harm to others (Omission-Physical; 22.1%,) 
then omitted acts resulting in emotional harm to others (Omission-Emotional; 14.1%).  
Furthermore, 43.4% of the participants who reported an (in)action endorsed only one type and 
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the remaining 56.6%, 40.2% endorsed two types, 9.6% endorsed three types, and 6.8% endorsed 
all four types.  
 Next, we explored whether different types of inactions were differentially associated 
with: (a) the amount of regret experienced; (b) the likelihood of the (in)action occurring during a 
combat or operational incident; (c) the likelihood of the (in)action occurring in conjunction with 
doing their job or duty; and (d) the likelihood that the (in)action increased the likelihood of the 
success of their unit’s mission.  The numbers presented in Table 1 represent means/proportions 
for all individuals who reported each of these additional variables for each type of (in)action.  To 
statistically test whether these additional variables were differentially associated with the 
different types of (in)actions, we conducted two types of analyses.  First, we compared the 
mean/likelihood of individuals who reported one type of (in)action but not another type of 
(in)action (e.g., reported commission – physical but did not report commission - emotional) with 
the mean/likelihood of individuals who reported the inverse (e.g., reported commission – 
emotional but did not report commission – physical). We then conducted independent sample t-
tests (for means) or chi-square tests (for proportions).  Second, we conducted paired sample t-
tests (for means) or McNemar tests (for proportions) among individuals who reported: (1) both 
Commission-Physical actions and Omission-Physical inactions (N = 49); (2) both Commission-
Emotional actions and Omission-Emotional inactions (N = 30), (3) both Commission-Physical 
and Commission-Emotional actions (N = 83); and (4) both Omission-Physical and Omission-
Emotional inactions (N =30).      
The mean regret scores (and standard deviations) for each type of (in)action are shown in 
the top half of Table 1.  The results of the independent samples t-tests (comparing the means 
regret scores of participants who reported one type of inaction but not the inverse type) showed 
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that participants reporting a Commission-Physical action (N = 133)  endorsed significantly less 
regret than participants reporting a Commission-Emotional actions (N = 153, t(284) = -2.08, p = 
.04) or Omission-Physical inactions (N = 99, t(230) = -2.83, p = .005).  Similar, tests comparing 
the mean regret score of other types of (in)actions (e.g., comparing Omission-Emotional (N =63) 
inactions with Omission-Physical inactions) revealed no significant differences.   
The results of the paired samples t-tests (exploring the difference in mean regret scores 
for individuals reporting more than one type of (in)action) showed that, among participants who 
reported both Commission-Physical and Omission-Physical (in)actions, the mean regret scores 
for Commission-Physical actions (M = 3.7, SD =1.0)  were again significantly lower than the 
mean regret scores for Omission-Physical inactions (M = 3.9, SD = 1.1, t(48) = -2.02, p = .04).  
No significant difference in regret scores was found among participants reporting any of the 
other pairs of (in)actions.  
The bottom half of Table 1 shows the proportion of participants who endorsed (i.e., 
answered “yes’) the additional characteristic/outcome variables (occurring during combat, doing 
one’s job/duty, and increasing the likelihood of success) for each type of (in)action.  The results 
of chi-square tests (comparing participants who endorsed one type of (in)action but not the 
inverse type of (in)action) once again revealed that Commission-Physical actions differed 
significantly from the other types of (in)actions. Specifically, participants reporting Commission-
Physical actions were significantly more likely to indicate that their action(s) improved the 
success of their unit’s mission than participants reporting only Commission-Emotional actions 
(χ2(1, N = 286) = 5.02, p = .02) and participants reporting only Omission-Physical inactions 
(χ2(1, N = 232) = 20.41, p < .001).  Participants reporting Commission-Physical actions were 
also significantly more likely to indicate that their action(s) occurred during a combat or 
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operational incident than participants reporting Commission-Emotional actions (χ2(1, N = 286) = 
13.62, p < .001).   
Next, the results of the McNemar tests revealed that participants reporting both a 
Commission-Physical action and an Omission-Physical inaction, were much more likely to 
report that their Commission-Physical action improved the success of their unit’s mission 
(77.6%) than their Omission-Physical inaction (53.1%, p = .002).  No other pairs of (in)actions 
were significantly differentially associated with any of the additional characteristic/outcome 
variables.  
Next, we examined the relationship between the different types of (in)actions and 
psychological problems (i.e., PTSD, dysphoria, and alcohol/substance use).  First, we coded a 
“yes” response to any of the (in)action questions as a 1 and “no” responses as a 0.  Next, we 
computed Pearson correlations to determine if participants who endorsed any or all of the 
(in)actions had higher levels of psychological problems (i.e., as evidenced by positive 
correlations).  The left half of Table 2 shows the zero-order correlations, and the right half of 
Table 2 shows the partial correlations (removing shared variance with age, gender, number of 
deployments and combat/post combat experience).  As expected, participants who endorsed any 
type of (in)action, also endorsed higher levels of PTSD, dysphoria and alcohol/substance use.  
We found it noteworthy, however, that alcohol/substance use demonstrated weaker associations 
with all of the (in)action types when compared to both PTSD and dysphoria.  Also, whereas 
Omission-Physical inactions were more-strongly associated with psychological problems than 
Omission-Emotional inactions, the opposite trend was evidenced among acts of commission 
(Commission-Physical actions had similar or weaker associations with psychological problems 
than Commission-Emotional actions).  When taking into account other factors (i.e., age, gender, 
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number of deployments and combat/post combat experience) only acts of Omission (Physical 
and Emotional) inactions continued to be significantly associated with all three psychological 
problems.  Notably, when the other factors were considered, Commission-Physical actions 
ceased to be significantly associated with any psychological problems.  
We then conducted three hierarchical regression analyses (predicting PTSD, dysphoria 
and alcohol/substance use) entering all four types of (in)actions simultaneously to determine if 
one or more types of (in)action(s) predict psychological problems independently of other types 
of (in)action(s).  The left half of Table 2 shows the results when all four types of (in)actions were 
entered in the first step, and the right half of Table 2 shows the results when the (in)actions were 
entered in the second step after entering age, gender, number of deployments and combat/post 
combat experience in the first step.  Only Omission-Physical inactions predicted all three forms 
of psychological problems even when the additional factors were taken into account.  By 
contrast, Commission-Physical actions predicted PTSD, but not dysphoria or alcohol/substance 
use, independently of other types of (in)actions; further, Commission-Physical actions ceased to 
predict any of the psychological problems when the additional factors were taken into account.  
When exploring both sides of Table 2, (in)actions resulting in emotional harm to others 
(Commission-Emotional and Omission-Emotional) predicted comparable increases in PTSD and 
dysphoria while neither significantly predicted alcohol/substance use.    
We also wanted to explore whether (in)actions that were regretted were more strongly 
associated with psychological problems than were (in)actions that were not regretted.  To do this, 
we first divided (in)actions into those that were regretted and not-regretted (considering only 
participants who reported a 4 or 5 (“agree”, “strongly agree”) on the regret question as endorsing 
regret).  Next, we used t-tests to compare participants who endorsed regretting their (in)action(s) 
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with participants who did not endorse regret.  Our results are shown in Table 3.  Yet again, 
Commission-Physical actions differed from other types of (in)actions. Participants who regretted 
Commission-Physical actions had significantly higher levels of both PTSD and dysphoria than 
participants who did not regret Commission-Physical actions.  In fact, regretted Commission-
Physical actions were associated with higher levels of psychological problems than any other 
types of (in)actions, whether regretted or not.  Among the other types of (in)actions, only 
participants reporting Commission-Emotional actions differed significantly in their reported 
levels of a psychological problem based on whether they regretted their (in)action; participants 
who regretted Commission-Emotional actions endorsed higher levels of dysphoria than 
participants who did not regret Commission-Emotional actions.   
Meanings and Interpretations 
 We then investigated whether participants who did and participants who did not report 
any type of (in)action endorsed different levels of breaking their own rules of right/wrong, 
altered worldviews, perceived appropriateness, guilt/shame, and psychological problems.  Table 
4 shows our results.  The outcome of independent sample t-tests revealed that participants who 
did report any type of (in)action reported significantly higher levels of psychological problems, 
guilt/shame, and all but one of the interpretations/meanings variables.  Interestingly, participants 
who did report any type of (in)action did not endorse different levels of perceived 
appropriateness when compared to participants who did not report any type of (in)action.  
Next, we explored the degree to which breaking one’s rules of right/wrong, altered 
worldviews, and perceived appropriateness were associated with psychological problems.  The 
left half of Table 5 shows the zero-order correlations, and the right half of Table 5 shows the 
partial correlations (removing shared variance with age, gender, and combat/post combat 
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experience).  Since prior research has already documented the importance of guilt/shame (e.g., 
Leskela, Dieperink, & Thuras, 2002), Table 5 also includes guilt/shame in order to illustrate the 
strength of the associations between the interpretations/meanings variables and psychological 
problems relative to guilt/shame.   Overall, there was consistent evidence of most 
meaning/interpretations (as well as guilt/shame) being associated with psychological problems.  
Once again, participants’ perception of the appropriateness of their (in)action(s) was noteworthy 
given that it, alone, was not directly associated with any of the measured psychological 
problems.    Alcohol/substance use was, again, less strongly associated with any/all of the 
predictor variables when compared to PTSD and dysphoria.  Though guilt/shame had stronger 
associations with psychological problems than breaking one’s rules of right/wrong (Z = 3.16, p < 
.001), altered worldviews were even more strongly associated with psychological problems than 
guilt/shame (Z = 5.43, p < .001). As can be seen in the right half of Table 5, when removing 
shared variance with age, gender, and combat/post combat experience, each of the associations 
that were significant continue to be significant.   
We also conducted three hierarchical regression analyses (predicting PTSD, dysphoria 
and alcohol/substance use) entering all three of the meanings/interpretations, as well as 
guilt/shame, simultaneously to determine which, if any, of these variables independently predicts 
psychological problems.  The left half of Table 4 shows the results when all 
meanings/interpretations and guilt/shame were entered in the first step, and the right half of 
Table 4 shows the results when the meanings/interpretations and guilt/shame were entered in the 
second step after entering age, gender, number of deployments and combat/post combat 
experience in the first step. Only altered worldviews predicted increases in any of the 
psychological problems independently of the other meaning/interpretation variables and 
  
26 
 
guilt/shame.  Indeed, as depicted in both the left and right sides of Table 4, altered worldviews 
predicted elevated levels of all three psychological problems even when age, gender, number of 
deployments and combat/post combat experiences were considered. 
Given that perceived appropriateness alone was not endorsed at a significantly different 
level by participants who reported an (in)action (when compared to participants who did not 
report an (in)action) and noting that perceived appropriateness was the only 
meanings/interpretations variable that was not strongly associated with psychological problems, 
we decided to explore perceived appropriateness in greater depth.  First, we tested our hypothesis 
that Service Members may judge the appropriateness of their (in)actions differently based on 
whether other people are present or if they perceive their (in)actions are protecting others 
(hereafter: protecting others).  To begin, we explored the proportion of participants who 
endorsed that others were present and whether they were protecting others.  Interestingly, a 
significant majority (81.2%) of participants reported that others were present during their 
(in)action(s) (χ2(1, N = 505) = 198.13, p < .001) while a smaller majority (57.0%) endorsed that 
they were protecting others (χ2(1, N = 505) = 9.98, p = .002) 
We then conducted hierarchical regression analyses (using centered variables) to explore 
whether the presence of others or protecting others was a better predictor of perceived 
appropriateness above and beyond age/gender, number of deployments and combat/post-combat 
experience.  We entered age and gender in the first step, number of deployments and 
combat/post-combat experience in the second step, and alternated between putting the presence 
of others and protecting others in the third and fourth steps.  Collectively, even after taking into 
account age, gender, number of deployments, and combat/post-combat experience, protecting 
others significantly predicted perceived appropriateness above and beyond the presence of others 
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(β = .27, ΔR2 = .06, p < .001).  However, the presence of others did not predict perceived 
appropriateness above and beyond protecting others (β = .06, ΔR2 = .004, p = .16).   
Finally, we considered the possibility that protecting others may moderate the association 
between perceived appropriateness and psychological problems.  We conducted three 
hierarchical regression analyses predicting PTSD, dysphoria, and alcohol/substance use entering 
predictors in the following order: (1) protecting others and perceived appropriateness; and (2) 
protecting others x perceived inappropriateness.   The interaction term improved the prediction 
of PTSD (β = -.25, ΔR2 = .01, p = .007) and dysphoria (β = -.24, ΔR2 = .01, p = .009), but did not 
improve the prediction of alcohol/substance use (β = -.12, ΔR2 = .00, p = .21).  Slope tests were 
used to reveal the nature of the interactions (Aiken & West, 1991).  Figure 1 presents the results 
of these analyses.  Higher levels of perceived appropriateness was significantly associated with 
lower levels of PTSD and dysphoria among Service Members who endorsed protecting others 
but not among Service Members who did not endorse protecting others.   
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CHAPTER 3: STUDY TWO 
 
The goal of this study was to: (a) gather descriptions of the events that Service Members 
consider to be acts of commission and omission; (b) investigate how Service Members’ 
interpretations of regretted (in)actions that occurred in their roles as Service Members change 
over time, specifically regarding: (1) whether the (in)action is regretted; (2) perceptions of the 
appropriateness of their (in)actions; (3) perceptions that their (in)actions broke their own rules of 
right and wrong; and (4) the impact of their (in)action(s) on their worldviews.   
Participants 
Participants were 14 (7% female) U.S. military veterans who had completed at least one 
deployment (M = 1.6, SD = 1.2) in the recent wars in Iraq and/or Afghanistan during the Global 
War on Terror.  Subjects ranged in age from 21 – 53 (M  = 25.3, SD = 7.1).  The sample 
consisted of veterans from European American (n = 8), African American (n = 3), Hispanic 
American (n = 2) and Asian American (n = 1) backgrounds.  Our sample included Service 
Members from four branches (Army: 5, Marines: 4, Air Force: 3, Navy: 2) of the U.S. Armed 
Forces. All subjects were recruited from another study (partially designed by Christian Williams 
and Howard Berenbaum) designed to create and evaluate the efficacy of two alternative 
interventions intended to support and facilitate Veterans’ transition into an academic setting.   
Half of our sample were no longer serving in the military while one-quarter (n = 3) were still 
serving full time (Active Duty) and the other one-quarter were serving part-time (Reserves, 
National Guard). 
Hoping to add greater detail about each of the different kinds of (in)actions explored in 
the questionnaire study, participants were chosen from a larger sample of interviewed Service 
Members (N = 38) for inclusion in this study based on the type of (in)action they depicted.   
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Correspondingly, given that another aim of the interviews was to gain greater insight and 
understanding about the (in)actions of Service Members, the participants who were included in 
this analysis were also chosen based on their ability to coherently describe a type of event while 
offering details/information that were exceptionally rich and insightful.  Whereas some 
participants were chosen based on their ability to clearly depict a type of event that was 
representative of an occurrence/incident that was more-common (e.g., communicated by multiple 
participants), others were chosen given the unique nature or type of event they recounted.   
Qualitative Interview 
Drawing on the limited clinical evidence and available research findings at the time of 
this study (e.g., Drescher et al., 2011; Litz et al., 2009; Shay, 1995), interview questions (see 
Appendix B) were prepared by Christian Williams, Howard Berenbaum, and Jennifer Greene.7  
Using guidelines proposed by Greene (2007) the interviews consisted of three sections: (1) a rich 
description (including when the regretted event happened, who else was present, what was the 
landscape or terrain, etc.) of the event that caused the Service Member to feel regret; (2) the 
participants emotional valence at the time of the event; and (3) how the participant has made 
sense of the event since it happened.   Moreover, the semi-structured design of the interview 
questions were designed to allow for a back-and-forth process that permitted the participant to 
describe their experience in their own terms while allowing the interviewer to ask clarifying 
questions.  Interviews were conducted by Williams, who possesses extensive experience working 
with military veterans.  The duration of the interviews varied (range: 40 – 110 minutes) with an 
average interview time of 65 minutes per participant. 
                                                 
7 Although we considered asking participants of the quantitative portion of the study to describe (voluntarily) their 
(in)action(s), we determined that the details of Service Members’ accounts were likely sensitive and unpleasant.  As 
a result, we only used in-person interviews to gain additional insights and understandings of the events 
corresponding to Service Members’ (in)action(s). 
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Part one of the interviews utilized an explorative design employing the critical incident 
(e.g., an event that affects subsequent behavior and actions) technique (CIT, Flanagan, 1954).  
The semi-structured interview asked participants to offer descriptions of regretted wartime 
events and included follow up questions that explored participants’ understanding and 
interpretation of specific (in)actions.  After the consent and introduction phase8, the first set of 
questions asked participants to describe a regretted event or events that occurred during their 
military service.  While the initial questions allowed participants to reflect and describe events 
and their (in)actions that occurred during these events, these descriptions will also allowed for 
“posturing” to occur, grounding the participant in the time and space of the event to allow for 
greater introspection regarding their subjective experience (e.g., feelings, interpretations; 
Sandelowski, 2000; Wolcott, 1994).  After the participant recounted a description of an event (or 
events), Williams then asked questions about the participant’s interpretation of the event and 
their (in)actions.  Questions asked participants to describe their feelings at the time of the event 
and follow-up questions asked participants to describe their current feelings about the event.   
The next portion of the interview asked participants to consider why their feelings have 
or have not changed.  Questions explored whether changes occurred at a specific moment (e.g., 
when they left the military) or if changes occurred gradually.  Follow-up questions also asked 
participants to consider why their interpretations changed when they changed (e.g., did the 
change correspond with a specific lifetime occurrence such as gaining a promotion in the 
military, leaving the military, or returning to school).  Williams then asked participants to 
consider their interpretations of their (in)actions.  Specifically, questions explored participants’ 
perceptions of having broken their own rules of right and wrong and whether their (in)actions 
                                                 
8 Participants will be informed during the consent phase and before the interview that the investigator will interview 
the participants using a digital audio recorder. 
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altered their conceptualization of themselves, others, and the world.  Williams asked whether the 
participant perceived their (in)action as appropriate at the time, who else was present during the 
event(s), and whether the presence of others and/or the perception of protecting others shaped 
their interpretation of the event.  For each of the interpretations (breaking rules of right/wrong, 
altered worldviews, perceived appropriateness), Williams asked participants to consider whether 
their judgments have changed over time and, if so, how they’ve changed.  Throughout the 
interview, prompts were used selectively to encourage elaboration and/or clarify responses when 
necessary (e.g., “Please say more about that.”). Participants were also informed that they could 
stop the interview at any point and the interviewer was attuned to shift questions and/or not 
probe deeper in instances where the participants were becoming unduly distressed. 
Since we recognized that Service Members’ interpretations and understandings of events 
and their (in)actions would likely be complex, we assumed some vagueness and even 
contradiction in the narratives gained from the interviews.  Thorne, Kirkham, and O’Flynn-
Magee (2004) have argued that qualitative interviewers should assume that participants will 
present diverging and even contradictory themes as they discuss their attempts to interpret past 
events.   For example, it may be that some Service Members’ feelings about the event(s) they 
recount have changed little (or not at all) over time, whereas other Service Members may have 
experienced differing emotions at differing times in response to their (in)actions. For this reason, 
Williams utilized a dialectic stance throughout the interview process encouraging “generative 
insights attained through a respectful conversation” (Greene, Benjamin, & Goodyear, 2001, p. 
79).   It was hoped that, by allowing inconsistencies in participant’s stories, a complex 
description of Service Members’ interpretation process would emerge.  Indeed, a major goal of 
the interviews was to allow participants to discern their understanding and interpretation through 
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different lenses, perspectives, and stances (e.g., how they felt about the event at the time and how 
they feel about the event now) while allowing participants to recount and recognize how their 
interpretations have changed (and perhaps even contradicted each other) over time (Greene, 
2007).    
Data Analysis 
The process of developing the content categories entailed three initial phases. Qualitative 
interviews were first recorded in an audio format and transcribed into written form by 
undergraduate students in clinical psychology with interests in working with this population. 
Each of the transcribed interviews was checked for accuracy by Williams.  Williams then 
identified similar themes across participants’ depictions of their (in)action(s) during their 
military service that correspond to three categories: (a) acts of commission; (b) acts of omission; 
or (c) both an act of commission and act of omission.  To identify thematic elements of 
participants descriptions of their (in)action(s), Williams engaged a cross case analysis following 
an incremental step-wise process.  Beginning with open thematic coding, Williams began by 
“taking data and breaking it down analytically” (Patton, 2014, p. 113), identifying larger themes 
within the participant’s account in order to classify Service Members’ (in)action(s) within one of 
the four categories.  Next, Williams identified themes or features within each category that were 
shared by multiple participants’ narratives.  Williams then returned to the descriptions of Service 
Members’ (in)action(s) for more specific word-level themes (themes within themes).  These 
analyses allowed for a clearer picture of the differing kinds (in)actions and events that Service 
Members may regret.   
The second step identified themes corresponding to Service Members’ interpretation of 
their (in)actions.  Williams utilized an inductive analytic strategy.  Since the major interpretive 
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categories were already identified (perceived inappropriateness, presence of others, protecting 
others, breaking one’s rules of right/wrong, and altered worldviews), Williams analyzed 
interviews to identify common and diverging themes about Service Members’ interpretations at 
the time of their (in)actions and changes to Service Members’ interpretations over time.  
Williams will also identify other interpretive themes that participants reference during the 
interviews. For example, in addition to analyzing participants responses to questions that 
specifically asked about interpretations, Williams also explored participants descriptions of the 
background leading up to their (in)action(s).  These sections of text were often significant and 
critical in capturing salient themes relating to the understandings and meanings that Service 
Members associate with their (in)actions.   
Using strategies suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994), Williams organized data by 
creating a time-ordered matrix (for an example, see Figure 2).  For each of the interpretation 
categories, the matrix contained a description of participants’ interpretations starting at the time 
of the event and at other times since the event.  The matrix also attempted to include themes 
from the participants’ accounts that explain why their interpretation changed when they changed 
(e.g., gaining a promotion in the military, leaving the military, returning to school).  Williams 
then followed Johnson’s (2004) steps of analytic induction in order to interpret participants’ 
interpretations of their (in)actions over time.  For example, a partial interpretation of the 
information contained in figure 1 may conclude that the Service Member was immediately 
troubled by their (in)action corresponding with unpleasant alterations to their understanding of 
themselves, others, and/or the world, yet, later in their military career, they interpreted their 
(in)action in a way that reshaped their viewpoint allowing them to enhance their sense leadership 
of others.  Hence, the inductive analysis will endeavor to draw conclusions and identify patterns 
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of how participants’ interpretations change (or do not change) over time and why these changes 
occur.   
As a third phase, meaning units were focused (Yeh & Inman, 2007) or organized into 
descriptive content categories by the first author via an inductive, iterative process that involved 
comparing and differentiating each meaning unit with the other meaning units.  
Meaning/interpretation themes were also compared with other meaning/interpretation themes to 
consider common trends in how Service Members consider their (in)action as well as common 
paths in how Service Members’ interpretations develop and change (or don’t change) over time.  
Throughout analysis, Williams engaged Fassenger’s (2005) constant comparison method.  
Specifically, when themes were identified for further consideration, Williams consistently 
returned to the transcripts to verify, clarify, and describe potential themes in greater depth and 
detail.  As also advised by the constant comparison technique, Williams continually checked to 
ensure that the codes remained consistent and closely related to the direct words of the 
participants.   
Results 
Descriptions of (In)actions 
 The following accounts offer depictions of participants’ (in)actions (please note that 
some accounts contain depictions of violence and harsh language).  To protect the identity of 
participants, pseudonyms do not reflect participant’s race or branch of service.  In order to allow 
for greater complementarity (permitting the findings from Study 2 to offer additional insight and 
clarity to the interpretations and findings of Study 1), accounts were categorized into the separate 
types of (in)actions explored in Study 1: (1) Commission-Physical (CP) actions; (2) 
Commission-Emotional (CE) actions; (3) Commission Physical and Emotional (CPE); (4) 
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Omission-Physical (OP) inactions; (5) Omission-Emotional (OE) inactions; (6) Omission 
Physical and Emotions (OPE); and (7) acts of commission and omission (CO) resulting in 
physical and emotional harm.9 We designed pseudonyms that would allow the reader to retain 
pertinent information about each participant throughout the narratives below (e.g., Craig the 
Convoy Gunner is the participant who describes an event where he was the gunner in a convoy).  
Participants’ pseudonyms are followed by a letter-number combination to remind the reader of 
the type of (in)action reported by the participant (e.g., OP-1 indicates that this is the individual 
that gave the first account of an Omission-Physical inaction – see accounts below).   
Our analysis also revealed that participants’ accounts differed based on who was 
impacted by their (in)action(s).  Participants distinguished between three different groupings of 
others, namely: (a) other non-Service Member individuals (e.g., civilians, enemy combatants); 
(b) fellow Service Members (e.g., other members of the participant’s military unit); or (c) both 
non-Service Members and Service Members.  Thus, in addition to categorizing accounts based 
on whether participants (in)action(s) involved commission or omission (or both) and whether the 
(in)action resulted in physical or emotional harm (or both), we also classified accounts based on 
the who was impacted by participants’ (in)action(s). 
Act of Commission resulting in Physical Harm 
Acts of commission that resulted in physical harm to others (Commission-Physical 
actions) were the most often-reported type of (in)action.   For all accounts of Commission-
Physical actions, participants referred only to the impact their action had on other non-Service 
Member individuals.  For example, two participants reported firing on civilian vehicles.  One 
                                                 
9 Though acts of commission and omission resulting in physical and emotional harm (category #7) were not 
explored directly in Study 1, some participants’ accounts depicted both commission and omission.  These accounts 
were categorized into their own, separate, category to allow for further exploration (e.g., ways in which they were 
similar and different to other categories of (in)actions).  
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Veteran, Greg the Gunner (CP-1), was who was 20-years-old at the time of the incident 
explained; 
I was on route Irish going from BIAP (Baghdad International Airport) to the green zone. 
We were running a 3 Humvee convoy transporting a Cpt and two LT's (two officers) up 
to another base I was in the point gun truck (the truck in the front) up in the turret. We 
encountered some heavy traffic and there was this one car that just would not move, in 
fact they drifted directly in front of us and slowed down almost "brake checking" us. 
There was far too heavy of a civilian area around to engage with the 50 cal (a weapon 
that fires large ammunition against armored vehicles or a large number of enemy 
combatants) so I reached down in the truck grabbed my m16 (rifle) and put one round 
right through the back windshield right into the base of the neck of the person driving, 
the car swerved off into a ditch and we drove past. 
Another participant, Charlie at Checkpoint (CP-2), was 24 at the time of the event.  He explains: 
We were in Iraq, slightly northwest of Baghdad. A car was speeding toward us, and 
believing it to be a VBIED (Vehicle-bourne Improvised Explosive Device), we engaged it 
with literally every weapon we had at the scene. When we approached the car, we 
learned that the car was full of noncombatants. It turned out that a young driver was at 
the wheel transporting some doctors from somewhere in the Anbar province into 
Baghdad. Being inexperienced and frightened, the driver stomped on the accelerator 
instead of the brake when we signaled for him to stop. Two of the occupants were killed 
immediately, and the other two were very badly wounded. I never learned what happened 
to the wounded, but I suspect that they probably ended up dying before or during 
surgery. 
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In addition to describing harm to other non-Service Members, these two participants also noted 
that combat scenarios in Iraq and Afghanistan often have an added layer of complexity caused by 
the uncertainty of which individuals and/or objects may be sources of potential threat. 
 The other participant who reported a Commission-Physical action, Sean the Sniper (CP-
3), was 20 at the time of the incident, described a Commission-Physical action: 
 I was a sniper positioned on a plateau providing oversight for a nearby unit.  
From my hidden position, I was watching two teenage males carrying a plastic bag next 
to a hole that appeared to hold an IED (Improvised Explosive Device).  A car came 
down the road and dropped off two guys and continued to drive away.  One was carrying 
an AK (the AK-47 is the most common weapon among enemy combatants in Iraq and 
Afghanistan) and the other hopped into the hole to wire the IED.  About 20 minutes later 
the car returned and picked up the two men but not the teenagers.  The teenagers handed 
the men the plastic bag which held the detonator for the bomb.  I thought the car would 
drive towards my position but instead turned around towards the opposite direction.  I 
opened fire.  The two passengers died and the driver survived by getting the car under an 
overpass.  I then fired at the teenagers and they ran to a nearby canal to take cover.  I 
called down to my unit to tell them the location of the IED and I flushed out the 
teenagers, using my weapon to get them to flee towards my unit.     
Similar to the other participants who reported a Commission-Physical action, Sean the Sniper 
described uncertainty about whether the individuals he was observing posed a threat. 
Furthermore, the details from participants who reported a Commission-Physical action all depict 
combat-related incidents where they engaged (used their weapon against) individuals who they 
believed were the enemy.  
  
38 
 
Acts of Commission resulting in Emotional harm 
 One example of a Commission-Emotional action came from a high ranking enlisted 
Soldier, Sergeant Sam (CE-1), who was 42 years old at the time and described the difficulties of 
managing a military unit:   
I felt like I was dealing with a bunch of 10 year-olds who were away from home for the 
first time and viewed the deployment as a trip to summer camp, not a war zone. It quickly 
turned into a bitch session about working conditions and post assignments.  I personally 
did not feel that the working conditions were bad at all, and felt that the complaints were 
not valid.  I too quickly lost my patience and erupted in a string of obscenities and verbal 
attacks on those complaining.   
The other depiction of a Commission-Emotional came from Ben the Berater (CE-2), who was 22 
(and not in a leadership position) at the time of the incident.  Ben shared another example of 
berating other Service Members:   
I caused emotional harm to another military member, whom I felt was not mature enough 
nor suited to be in the military. My comments were pretty harsh and my shipmates really 
started to give him a hard time too.  One day, he was just gone.  So, I guess I’m saying 
that what I did contributed to someone deserting the military.  The military does not take 
that shit lightly.  But he’d rather face a court-martial than face the people that were 
supposed to have his back. 
Whereas participants depicted all Commission-Physical actions as involving non-Service 
Members (e.g., either real or perceived threat from enemy combatants), depictions of 
Commission-Emotional actions only involved other Service Members.   
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Act of Commission resulting in Physical and Emotional harm 
The one depiction of an act of commission that resulted in physical and emotional harm 
to others came from a Scott the (anti) Scavenger (CPE-1) who was 20 at the time of the incident: 
My unit came upon a family that was scavenging from the ASP (Ammunition Service 
Point or location for procuring ammunition and supplies).  When we tried to stop them 
fleeing in a vehicle, we shot at the vehicle.  The family’s little girl was shot in the head.  
The other family members were panicking and our medic flying with us that day was the 
newest we had.  He became very sad and started to panic as he tried to help the girl and 
the other injured family members.  I had to talk him through each standard of care like I 
was giving information to a kid.  
While this participant depicts harm to non-Service Members when describing the Commission-
Physical action, the Commission-Emotion action is depicted in terms of harm to a fellow Service 
member.   
Act of Omission resulting in Physical harm 
 The one example of an Omission-Physical inaction came from Conner the Convoy 
Commander (OP-1) who was 31 at the time.    
I was a convoy commander and did not do a good job of planning our a supply trip 
because I’d already made the same trip multiple times.  I left a lot of the planning to the 
younger guys and was pretty much on auto pilot.  The convoy was ambushed and we lost 
two men. 
Thus, whereas Commission-Physical actions tended to involve non-Service Members, Omission-
Physical inactions only involved fellow Service Members.   
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Act of Omission resulting in Emotional harm 
 Two participants described an Omission-Emotional inaction.  The first came from, Henry 
who didn’t Help (OE-1), who was 22 at the time: 
The events occurred at my first duty station involving my immediate supervisor.  He was 
an alcoholic.  He would often come to work having obviously consumed alcohol and 
would drink on the job.  Every subsequent hour he slurred more and more.  He even used 
to go up to the conference room with the walkie-talkie and nap on shift.  I was among 
many others knew about his addiction and did nothing to help him. Eventually during a 
deployment to Saudi Arabia (I was in a different squadron as was by then) he got sent 
home due to his problem.   My friend's issues continued for quite some time, and I'm sure 
they contributed to his multiple divorces since. 
The other Omission-Emotional account comes from Roberta who didn’t Report (OE-2) who was 
23 at the time of the incident.   
I had a senior NCO make a serious advancement towards me. I blew him off and didn't 
do anything about it. I didn't want to make waves.  I should’ve elevated it up the chain 
and said something.  I later discovered that, after I left the unit, the same senior NCO had 
harassed other girls. 
Thus, similar to Omission-Physical inactions, participants who reported an Omission-Emotional 
action described the harm of their inactions in terms of fellow Service Members.   
Act of Omission resulting in Physical and Emotional harm 
 Similar to acts of commission that resulted in both physical and emotion harm, acts of 
omission resulting in both physical and emotional harm to others involved both non-Service 
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Members and fellow Service Members.  The first depiction came from Blake at the Blast site 
(OPE-1) who was 21 at the time of the incident: 
We had a mass casualty situation caused by a VBIED and had over 20 injured and dead.   
Because we were a small detachment we had to prioritize who got treatment and who 
didn't.  After everything settled down a bit, I noticed that we were unable to help a  family 
of locals who lost 3 children and their mother.  
The other medic, Mike the Medic  (OPE-2), was 20 at the time of the incident and 
described a similar scenario where both U.S. military personnel and civilians were injured due to 
a VBIED: 
The market of the nearby village was hit by an explosive hidden in van that was parked in 
the middle where the most people would be.  A lot of people were hurt or killed.  I was in 
my barracks and heard the bomb.  I asked others what happened and no one knew.  
While I was trying to get more info, I missed the announcement that a medical convoy 
was leaving to help.  I missed the convoy and was left, stuck, and unable to help.  I tried 
to get a vehicle so I could catch up to the others, but was not allowed to leave.  We lost 
some of our own who were providing security for the village and a lot of civilians died 
because they didn’t get medical help. I believe I lost the respect of a lot of other people 
because I didn’t do anything.  
Though other participants who reported acts of omission only referred to fellow Service 
Members, these depictions of inactions resulting in both physical and emotional harm to others 
describe harm to both non-Service Members and fellow Service Members.  It is worth noting, 
however, that both accounts in this category were recounted by military medics.  Since their 
responsibilities require that they both confront the enemy (to include using deadly force when 
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necessary) while, at the same time, providing medical aide to both fellow Service Members and 
injured non-Service Members, combat medics often face stressors that other military specialties 
do not. 
Acts of Commission and Omission 
 Three participants described (in)actions that were both acts of commission and omission.  
All scenarios resulted in both physical and emotional harm to others.  One infantry Marine, 
Artillery Art  (CO-1), was 22 at the time of the incidents and described both an action and 
inaction that resulted in physical harm to other non-unit members (Commission-Physical and 
Omission-Physical) and emotional harm to himself and other members of his unit (Commission-
Emotional and Omission Emotional): 
I was stationed at a dangerous post where we received a lot of incoming fire, both from 
snipers and from enemy squads.  On one occasion we were taking heavy fire from a 
group of Taliban in a building on the other side of a small ravine from my outpost.  I was 
firing our .50 cal at them while trying to call in their location to our artillery unit.  The 
first few artillery rounds came in and missed and I was trying to center their fire on the 
enemy’s location.  As I was looking at the enemy’s location through my scope, I noticed 
two young boys, not older than 10 years old, run into the building.  Minutes later the next 
round of artillery came in and completely destroyed the building.  I didn’t tell anyone 
what I saw, but I could tell from the look on other’s faces that they had seen what I saw.  
That image still haunts me.  
Another infantry Service Member, Radio Ralph (CO-2), was 21 at the time of the 
incidents.  This Veteran described a series of events where his actions in one scenario resulted in 
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emotional harm (Commission-Emotional) which led to a subsequent inaction that resulted in 
physical harm to other unit members (Omission-Physical): 
I was in a convoy and we hit an IED.  I got on all of the radios and tried to call in our 
location for help.  The sergeant in charge told pointed at me and told me to shut up.  
Later, we found out the no one was hurt and the sergeant mocked me in front of the rest 
of the unit and I believe they felt they couldn’t trust me to stay cool if we got into a fight.  
I felt betrayed and couldn’t look my leaders in the face after that.  About a week later, we 
were in a similar situation and my convoy was attacked.  I did my best to fire back and 
assist my gunner in picking out the enemy.  But I didn’t call in for help.  Later I found out 
that we had lost a few in the truck behind us.     
The third example comes from, No shoot Ned (CO-3), who was 19 years old at the time. 
In this scenario, the participant describes a Commission-Physical action that involved non-
Service Members and an Omission-Physical inaction that involved both non-Service Members 
and other Service Members.   
I was in an engagement where small arms fire was exchanged with the Taliban.  I was 
returning fire and noticed three or four young men in civilian clothing hop into the back 
of a truck.  I thought they were trying to get out of the area so I made a split second 
decision not to fire at them.  A few minutes later, I noticed that that another one of our 
units was receiving incoming fire from another location.  When I glanced over, I noticed 
that it was the guys who hopped into the truck who were firing at them.  My unit was too 
busy engaging others for me to do anything to help.  The other unit took heavy casualties.   
Interestingly, the accounts of events involving both acts of commission and omission reflected 
the same themes that were found in events only involving an act of commission or an act of 
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omission.  Specifically, details that were specific to Commission-Physical actions (e.g., firing at 
enemy combatants) involved non-Service Members.  Details specific to Commission-Emotional 
(e.g., berating fellow Service Members) and Omission-Physical (e.g., not reporting problematic 
behaviors of fellow Service Members) (in)actions referred more-specifically to fellow Service 
Members.  Acts of omission that resulted in both physical and emotional harm (e.g. not shooting 
at unknown individuals and not preventing an artillery strike on an enemy outpost) involved both 
non-Service Members and Service Members alike.  
Meanings and Interpretations 
Regret 
 When asked about their interpretation(s) at the time of the event or events, each 
participant offered additional insight about why they chose the event (or events) they described.  
Though, the interviewer did not ask participants to address their regret directly at this time, each 
participant discussed how their regret shaped the significance of the event they chose to describe.  
For example, Sergeant Sam (CE-1) who reported berating and scolding his subordinates noted: 
By demeaning those who I was supposed to care for, I think I did more damage to my 
ability to lead this group of people than any other thing I could have done.  This behavior 
was completely out of character, and, of all of my experiences during any of my 
deployments, it is the one thing that I did I wish I could do over. 
Indeed, each participant echoed Sergeant Sam noting that, if given the chance, they would have 
changed all or part of the scenarios they described.   
Participants’ depictions of regret varied based on the type of (in)action they reported.  
Yet again, participants who reported a Commission-Physical action were unique.  Without any 
prompting from the interviewer, participants described either regretting: (a) their 
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conduct/behavior (i.e., the action itself); (b) the result of their action; or (c) both their action and 
the result of their action.  As an illustration, Sean the Sniper (CP-3), who described killing 
enemy combatants who were constructing an IED and then firing at two teenagers explained that, 
though he did not regret the outcome, he did regret some of his actions:   
‘I feel, very much, that is was a successful mission.  There is a sense of pride that we put 
that [the mission] together.  We gathered intelligence, we were patient, and it played out 
how we were expecting it; roughly how we called it. But, there is sorta that voice, if I 
rehash it.  There’s a voice in my head that says maybe we shouldn’t of engaged the kids 
again when they were in the grove [hiding]. Ummm, maybe we shouldn’t of tried to kill 
them all and just focused on the clearly adult males.  
By contrast, Greg the Gunner (CP-1) who described firing on a civilian vehicle that continuously 
moved dangerously close to his convoy depicted feeling no regret for his actions but regret for 
the outcome: 
 I saw similar situations happen too many times and it ended without somebody pulling 
the trigger and the front Humvee being struck with a VBIED and losing guys. Again a lot 
happened and I pulled the trigger a lot before that and a lot after that.  But for some 
reason that one sticks out I think it’s because it was the only time that a civilian died. I 
wish that hadn’t happened. 
The third participant who described a Commission-Physical incident, Charlie at Checkpoint (CP-
2), whose unit fired on an approaching vehicle (and later discovered that the car was transporting 
civilian doctors) reported:   
I know that the situation was dangerous but I do believe that we responded a bit quickly 
and used too much force. It was shitty that we killed some innocent civilians, especially 
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doctors just trying to help people. That was the one and only incident over there where I 
regret harming somebody. 
Whereas the other two depictions of Commission-Physical actions reported regretting only their 
action or only the outcome of their action, this participant reports feeling regret for both their 
Commission-Physical action and the result of their action. 
Participants reporting other types of (in)actions, did not make any distinction between 
regretting their inaction(s) and regretting the outcome.  Henry who didn’t Help (OE-1) who 
reported not helping a fellow Service Member who was struggling with an alcohol addiction 
noted: 
He was eventually caught drinking on the job and they sent him home early from our 
deployment.  He was a good person and even a better Airman.  Now others will never 
have the opportunity to work with him or learn from him the way I did. 
Similarly, Blake at the Blast site (OPE-1) who reported being unable to save civilian family 
members who were the victims of an explosion noted: 
I keep thinking about the little boy who died.  He was the same age as my boy and he 
never had the chance to grow up like my boy.  
Thus, rather than distinguishing between regretting one’s actions or regretting the outcome of 
one’s actions, participants who reported non-Commission-Physical (in)actions expressed regret 
due to lost opportunities associated with their (in)actions.   
 Interestingly, participants who reported more than one type of (in)action shared themes of 
regret with both Commission-Physical actions and non-Commission-Physical (in)actions.  Scott 
the (anti) Scavenger (CPE-1) noted:   
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I know we did the right thing by firing at them.  We did what we were supposed to.  It 
sucks that people had to die.  But it was the look on my medic’s face that I couldn’t get 
over.  He’s trying to do his job and I’m yelling at him.  I dropped the ball and he came 
away thinking that he had failed those people.  He never went on another mission with us 
and we lost a good one. 
Similarly, Artillery Art (CO-1) reported:   
I did what I had to do.  I don’t feel bad about firing at the people who were shooting at 
us.  I feel bad because I could’ve stopped those mortars and a couple of boys died.  I’ll 
never know for sure what the future would have looked like for them, but I think about it.  
I ask, “Was I the good guy or the bad guy here”?  I still don’t know. 
Thus, when describing their Commission-Physical actions (firing at non-Service Members) these 
participants report feeling regret for the outcome (but not their action).  Yet when they describe 
other types of (in)actions, Scott the (anti) Scavenger and Artillery Art depict regret over lost 
opportunities.       
Broke Rules of Right/Wrong and Appropriateness 
 The interviewer then asked Service Members to consider whether they perceived that 
their (in)action(s) broke their rules of right and wrong and whether they interpreted their 
(in)action as appropriate. Once again, Service Members who described a Commission-Physical 
action were unique in how they interpreted their (in)action(s).  Specifically, participants 
depicting a Commission-Physical action adapted referenced the military’s Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOP) when explaining their perceptions of whether they broke their rules of right 
and wrong and the appropriateness of their action(s).   
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Within a military context, SOPs are manualized, written rules/regulations for performing 
a task and/or function.  The function of SOPs, therefore, is to systematize nearly everything 
(from correct appearance/wearing of a military uniform to methods for conducting convoy 
operations) within the military profession.  By familiarizing themselves with the SOPs, Service 
Members learn the military’s expectations for their conduct and behavior as well as a manualized 
outline for most (if not all) functions that are pertinent to their roles, responsibilities, and duties 
(Posen, 1986).   
Among the military’s myriad SOPs, the rules of engagement (ROE) are among the most 
important for deployed Service Members.  The ROE lay out the guidelines and instructions for 
using force against a source that is dangerous and/or threatening (e.g., an individual who is firing 
their weapon towards the Service Member’s location).  Though Service Members will have 
various understandings and familiarity of the ROE (e.g., based on whether their job/duty makes 
it more likely that they will confront dangerous/threatening scenarios), most, if not all, deployed 
Service Members are familiar with two of the primary principles of the ROE:  (1) the principle of 
discrimination; and (2) the principle of proportionality (Perry, 1995).  Though each of these 
principles are multifaceted, the principle of discrimination essentially states that U.S. Service 
Members can only use force (deadly or otherwise) against a threatening target (e.g., can only fire 
their weapon at enemy combatants and not at civilians).  The principle of proportionality, on the 
other hand, notes that Service Members can only use the force necessary to eliminate the threat 
(e.g., U.S. Forces cannot use an explosive device designed to destroy a large geographical area 
on one or two enemy combatants).  
All participants reporting a Commission-Physical action referenced the ROE (and 
inferred both the principle of discrimination and the principle of proportionality) when 
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describing their perceptions of breaking their rules of right and wrong and the appropriateness of 
their action(s).  Greg the Gunner (CP-1), who reported shooting the driver of a car because the 
car was dangerously close to his convoy noted: 
I’ve gone through the entire scenario again and again and I know I did the right thing.  
Since there were so many civilians, I made sure that I didn’t use my .50 cal. I did feel like 
shit when I realized that the driver was a civilian.   
Greg’s expression that “There were too many civilians around so I didn’t use my .50 cal,” refers 
to the principle of proportionality while his remorse about the victim being a civilian is 
referencing the principle of discrimination.  Similarly, Charlie at Checkpoint (CP-2), who 
reported shooting at an oncoming vehicle that was speeding towards his checkpoint noted: 
I do think that I did what I had to do.  But we really used everything we had against that 
car.  We could have done better to follow the rules. But, yeah, again, killing a bunch of 
doctors, that’s fucked up. 
Sean the Sniper (CP-3), the other Service Member who reported a Commission-Physical action 
where he shot to kill two teenagers after shooting and killing adults in a car who had activated a 
roadside improvised explosive device, noted: 
I made sure that the people I shot were trying to hurt us before I opened fire.  But, 
shooting at unarmed kids?  That keeps coming back to me. 
Thus, when discussing how ROE shaped their interpretations of the appropriateness of their 
action(s), all participants reporting a Commission-Physical action also depicted the complexities 
of following the ROE within the context of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Both 
participants who reported shooting at an unknown civilian vehicle (Greg the Gunner and Charlie 
at Checkpoint) noted that uncertainty of the inhabitants or contents of vehicle (e.g., inability to 
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follow the rule of discrimination).  When compared to other large-scale conflicts involving the 
U.S. Armed Forces (e.g., World War II, Korea, Vietnam), U.S. Service Members are often 
unable to distinguish civilians from armed fighters.   
 Participants describing a Commission-Physical action also stressed that their action(s) 
were influenced by the need to protect others.  For example, Greg the Gunner (CP-1) stated: 
 It was my job to make sure we all got to our destination alive.  I did what I did and, 
 whether it was right or wrong, we got where we need to go. 
Similarly, Charlie at Checkpoint (CP-2) noted: 
When the car was speeding towards us, I was thinking, “Someone’s going to get hurt, I 
gotta do something.” 
Interestingly, therefore, participants describing a Commission-Physical had a specific set of 
criteria (i.e. ROE and protecting others) that they referenced when determining whether the 
appropriateness of their action(s) and whether they broke their rules of right and wrong.    
In contrast to interpretations associated with Commission-Physical actions, participants 
who reported other non-Commission-Physical types of (in)actions perceived that their 
(in)action(s) both inappropriate and broke their rules of right and wrong.  Ben the Berater (CE-2) 
whose badgering contributed to a fellow Service Member’s desertion noted:   
I have no excuses.  My parents raised me better than this.  I hurt someone to the point 
that they felt like they would rather go AWOL (absent without leave) then be around me.  
The military does not take that shit lightly.  The poor kid was threatened with a Court 
Martial and ended up getting kicked out all together.  I told myself I was just having fun, 
but, man, I really let them down.   
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Another example of interpreting the appropriateness of a non-Commission-Physical (in)action 
and whether the (in)action broke one’s rules of right wrong came from Roberta who didn’t 
Report (OE-2) (who decided to not report sexually inappropriate comments from her NCO) 
noted: 
All of my training and everything inside me told me to report him.  I just didn’t want to 
make things awkward.  Now I have a hard time looking other female vets in the eye.  I 
didn’t protect those who needed protecting. 
Thus, whereas participants associated the appropriateness of their Commission-Physical actions 
with protecting others, participants associated the inappropriateness of non-Commission-
Physical (in)actions with failing to protect others. 
Once again participants who reported multiple types of (in)actions reflected the themes 
from both the Commission-Physical participants as well as the participants who reported other 
types of (in)actions.  Radio Ralph (CO-2) who called for help during an IED attack but, due to 
his leader’s rebuke, later did not call for help: 
I was really going through SOP in my mind through the entire first scenario.  I was trying 
to take out the threat and call in for help.  I was new, the guys around me were new and I 
was trying to help them while trying to stay calm and do my job.  But, shit, that NCO 
made me feel like an asshole.  The next attack came and I didn’t do my job.  Others got 
hurt because of my damn pride.   
When referring to his Commission-Physical action, the Service Member refers to ROE and 
protecting others.  Yet, when referring to another event, he explains that his non-Commission-
Physical inaction was inappropriate because he failed to protect others.    
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Mixing Methods (additional exploration of quantitative data) 
When describing their interpretations, participants revealed other considerations that 
further complicated their perceptions of the appropriateness of their (in)actions and whether they 
perceived that they broke their rules of right/wrong.  For example, participants noted the stark 
difference between the military’s rules of right and wrong and the rules they grew up with (and 
the rules of the communities they returned home to). As an illustration, Sean the Sniper (CP-3) 
noted: 
Which rules are we talking about?  I followed what I believed the rules were given my 
mission.  But, yeah, there’s that voice in your head that says, ‘No, you don’t kill people’, 
‘No, you don’t pull the trigger.’  So this whole question of rules.  Which rules?   
Other participants noted that the extreme difference between the contextual rules that they 
followed during a deployment and the civilian rules they returned to shaped their judgements of 
what they could and could not share with others.  Greg the Gunner (CP-1) noted: 
Hell no I didn’t break the rules.  I did what I had to do.  But…wow…I sure as fuck can’t 
tell people around here about this thing.  They would look at me and ask, ‘How in the hell 
can you shoot someone you don’t know?  You didn’t know they were trying to hurt you.’ 
So yeah, I guess when you say “rules”, it gets real tricky real fast.  When I put on my 
civilian cap I would have to say that I broke my rules and what I did was unacceptable.  
But then I remember what it was like over there.  It’s impossible to explain to someone 
who hasn’t been there. 
Similar to Greg the Gunner, a majority of participants noted that they feel conflicted when they 
consider the values they grew up with to judge the appropriateness of their (in)action(s) and 
whether they broke their rules of right/wrong. 
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 Another complication expressed by interview participants was the contradiction between 
what they considered “appropriate” and what they considered “right or wrong”.  For example, 
Connor the Convoy Commander (OP-1), reported that the attack on his convoy was due to a lack 
of planning/information-gathering.  He remarked: 
I guess I haven’t considered this in terms of whether it was “appropriate”.  You asked if I 
broke my rules and I did, I really broke all of the rules.  I would say it doesn’t matter if 
everything was appropriate but I think that’s wrong.  I guess the two are connected.  I 
broke the rules, but appropriate is harder.  I delegated some tasks.  As the person in 
charge, I should be able to delegate.  I can’t do everything.  So, that was appropriate.  
But, I should have also double and triple checked everything, that was inappropriate.  I 
keep going back and forth on this.  And I guess, now that I think about it, it’s harder to 
say whether I broke my rules.  I broke some rules, but I guess I didn’t break others.  
 Here, the participant acknowledges that, although their interpretations of appropriateness and 
breaking their own rules of right/wrong are inter-related, these interpretations are particularly 
difficult.  Indeed, Connor’s reflection signifies that the complexity of some wartime events may 
not allow for a clear or distinct (e.g., yes or no; right or wrong; appropriate or inappropriate) 
interpretation. 
Acknowledging the complicated association between participants’ perceptions of 
breaking their rules of right/wrong and their interpretations of appropriateness, we decided to 
return to the quantitative data to explore these interpretations in more depth.  Specifically, we 
considered the possibility that Service Members interpretations of the appropriateness of their 
(in)action(s) might moderate the association between their perceptions of having broken their 
own rules of right/wrong and psychological problems.  We conducted three hierarchical 
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regression analyses predicting PTSD, dysphoria, and alcohol/substance use entering predictors in 
the following order: (1) perception of breaking one’s own rules of right/wrong and 
appropriateness; and (2) perception of breaking one’s rules of right/wrong X appropriateness.   
Figure 3 presents the results of these analyses.  The interaction term improved the prediction of 
PTSD (β = .13, ΔR2 = .02, p < .001) and dysphoria (β = .10, ΔR2 = .01, p = .008), and 
alcohol/substance use (β = .09, ΔR2 = .01, p = .02).  Slope tests were used to reveal the nature of 
the interactions (Aiken & West, 1991).  The perception that (in)actions broke one’s rules of right 
and wrong was significantly associated with higher levels of PTSD, dysphoria, and 
alcohol/substance among participants with high, moderate, and low levels of perceived 
appropriateness.  Thus, among participants who reported that their (in)action was appropriate, 
those who also reported a greater perception that their (in)action(s) broke their rules of 
right/wrong report endorsed higher levels of psychological problems.     
 Back to Meanings and Interpretations (return to qualitative data) 
Altered Worldviews 
 The final interpretation that Service Members described during the interview was the 
extent to which they believed that their (in)action(s) altered their worldviews (e.g., changed their 
conceptualizations of themselves, others, and or the world).  Though all participants noted that 
their (in)action(s) prompted some change to their worldview, participants differed concerning 
which worldviews changed.  Specifically, participants referred only to alterations to their 
conceptualizations of: (a) themselves; or (b) others/the world more generally.  Interestingly, 
whereas participants reporting Commission-Physical actions described somewhat unique 
accounts when describing their interpretations of regret, appropriateness, and right/wrong, their 
descriptions of altered worldviews shared similar characteristics with participants reporting other 
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acts of commission. Similarly, the details of altered worldviews related by participants reporting 
an act of omission were shared by other participants who reported an act of omission. 
 All participants who reported any act of commission noted altered worldviews primarily 
associated with others/the world more generally.  Greg the Gunner (CP-1) noted that his outlook 
on the world changed after he shot the civilian driver of a car:  
After you’ve been in something like that, your outlook changes.  I started to see that 
things don’t always go according to plan…shit happens.  There’s no script.  The world is 
a dangerous place, especially when you live in Iraq. 
Similarly, Ben the Berater (CE-2) shared that he started to see others differently after a fellow 
Service Member disserted the military after his continuous berating: 
I recognized that other people are kinda fragile.  I was a kid when all this happened so I 
think this was the first time that I realized that people need support from others and not 
just bullshit.  I thought I was being funny but it was obviously not funny.  I didn’t realize 
that other people could just break over something as stupid as words.   
Scott the (anti) Scavenger noted that after his unit shot and killed members of a family that were 
scavenging a supply outpost, his outlook on others and the world changed: 
When I saw the parents wailing over their daughter’s body, I think that was the first time 
I recognized that families are the same everywhere.  These people loved their daughter 
the same way that I love my daughter.  Americans aren’t special or have some monopoly 
on what’s good or what’s important.  We all love and we all feel anguish when something 
happens to people we love. 
Thus, following an act of commission, participants reported changes to their understanding of the 
world (e.g., the world is not predictable), and other individuals (e.g., others are dangerous).   
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 Whereas participants who reported acts of commission only described alterations to their 
conceptualizations of others and the world, participants who reported acts of omission only 
described alterations to their conceptualizations of themselves.  Henry who didn’t Help (OE-1) 
reported that he started seeing himself differently when he did not help his supervisor who was 
suffering with an alcohol addiction: 
I was really shook by this.  I started to question whether I was a good friend.  Hell, I 
started to question whether I was a good person.  Who just sits around and let’s their 
buddy slowly kill their career and their marriage?  I really started to question whether 
I’d be a good leader and whether I deserved to wear the uniform. 
Mike the Medic who couldn’t help (OPE-2), the medic who was unable to get to the site of an 
explosion that killed a large number of both fellow Service Members and non-Service Members 
reported: 
I had an ability to put myself in the position to help and despite everything I tried, I 
failed.  I feel like saving just one life would have been a badge of honor, a story that I 
would have been honored to share.  I don’t get to say that.  Instead, all I have are stories 
about being worthless and doing nothing. 
Following acts of omission, therefore, participants reported second-guessing valued aspects of 
their personality (e.g., Am I a good friend?).  Moreover, the changes to participants’ 
characterizations of themselves led to doubts and questions about their identities as a Service 
Member more generally (e.g., Am I a good Service Member if I don’t help others?). 
 Once again, participants who reported both acts of commission and omission reflected 
themes from participants who reported only commission and from participants who reported only 
omission.  Artillery Art (CO-1) noted that after the event where his actions and inactions resulted 
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in the death of two young boys, resulted in detrimental changes to his understanding of himself 
and the world: 
Once you see the bodies of a couple of kids, it sticks with you, it leaves imprints.  I started 
questioning mankind’s role in the world.  I thought, “man the world is just broken and we 
keep breaking it.”  I was really angry at myself.  I told myself that if I couldn’t help a 
couple of helpless kids then what good was I. 
Radio Ralph (CO-2) noted that after his superior rebuked him in front of others for over-reacting 
(which led to him subsequently not calling for backup during a later ambush): 
I started hating everyone in authority.  I couldn’t stand for others to tell me what to do.  
And then I didn’t do something that I should have done.  I then I started wondering if I 
was any good or if maybe that Sergeant Major was right about me.  Was I made of the 
right stuff to be Soldier? 
In both narratives, participants’ acts of commission corresponded with changes to their 
conceptualization of others/the world (e.g., questioning mankind’s “goodness”; hating others in 
authority), while their acts of omission corresponded with changes to their conceptualizations of 
themselves (e.g., Am I a good person? Am I worthy to be in the military?). 
Changes to Interpretations and Current “Impact” of (In)actions 
 Throughout the interview, participants were asked to consider if their interpretations had 
changed .  Before moving to the next category of interpretations (e.g., perceptions that the 
participant broke their own rules of right/wrong, interpretations of the appropriateness of their 
(in)action, alterations to participants’ worldviews) the interviewer asked participants to reflect 
whether their interpretation had changed since the event, and if so, how it had changed.  The 
interviewer also asked if there was a specific reason or catalyst for changes to participants’ 
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interpretations (e.g., being promoted to a leadership position).  Outside of the association 
between returning home and the (sometimes stark) recognition of different norms/rules (e.g., 
differences between the norms/rules of a warzone and the civilian world), participants mentioned 
no particular events that corresponded with changes to their interpretations.    
 Interestingly, all participants reported that their interpretations of appropriateness and 
their perceptions of breaking their rules of right/wrong did not change.   Charlie at Checkpoint 
(CP-2) noted: 
I still think we really went all out on that car.  I guess that’s one of the reasons that it was 
the first event that came to mind.  But sitting here, I can still feel the fear and the dread 
for my guys that I felt when that car started speeding up.  If I had it to do over, I still 
would have had to attack, although I would hope that I wouldn’t open up on them the way 
we did. 
Though participants who reported a Commission-Physical action maintained the same 
orientation towards the ROE when considering their perspective of whether they broke their 
rules of right and wrong, they also continued to base their interpretations of the appropriateness 
of their action(s) on the conviction that they were protecting others. 
Participants who reported non-Commission-Physical actions referred to their belief that 
they had failed to protect when explaining why their interpretations had not changed. For 
example, Roberta who didn’t Report (OE-2) noted: 
I still can’t justify that I didn’t report that ass hole.  And I still can’t get over that others 
might have suffered because I didn’t do what I know I should have done.  So, yeah, I still 
think about it, and, yeah, I still think I fucked up. 
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Thus, when determining whether their (in)action broke their own rules of right/wrong and 
whether their (in)action was appropriate, Service Members appear to use the same justifications 
and methods (e.g., whether they followed the ROE, whether they were protecting others) at the 
time of the event as they do years later.  
 By contrast, participants did report that changes to worldview continued to change over 
time.  However,  the degree of change to worldviews varied by participant.  Greg the Gunner 
(CP-1) who noted viewing the world as unpredictable (e.g., “There’s no script”) and that his 
understanding of the world had changed since shooting a civilian driver remarked: 
Ya know, I don’t think much has changed.  I still walk out the door and think, “Okay 
world, what kind of fucked up shit do you have planned for me today?”  I look at others 
just going on with their day, assuming that everything will go exactly the way they’ve 
planned and I’m thinking, “If you only knew”. 
Similarly, Sergeant Sam (CE-1) noted: 
I think that really did me in.  I never really sought for opportunities to get promoted after 
that.  I did my job, but I’m not sure I was great at it.  I wanted nothing to do with 
supervising others.  I still question my abilities at nearly everything.  I had spent so much 
time getting to a place where I was responsible for others and then I hated the people 
under my care.  It feels like I’ve doubted everything I’ve done since then. 
In these cases, negative alterations to participants’ worldviews (e.g., the world is not safe, I’m 
not a good person) appear to persist.  Moreover, Service Members sometimes reported that 
negative changes to their worldviews deepened or became worse.     
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 Other participants reported that changes to their worldviews had expanded over time.  For 
example, Roberta who didn’t Report (OE-2) noted that she has recognized that multiple factors 
were involved in her decision to not report her superior: 
This event comes to mind quite a bit.  But, I’ve had to look at it from different angles.  
Could I have done more? Yes.  But, was the situation fucked up? Hell yes.  Was the 
environment terrible?  Yeah, we were at war.  Can I be responsible for everything bad 
that happens?  Nope.  Could I have made things worse by reporting him?  I hate to admit 
it, but yes.  The military is awful when it comes to sexual shit. 
Participant Sean the Sniper (CP-3) noted that he has also considered the scenario from multiple 
perspectives: 
Yeah, I know I could have probably done better.  I guess I’ve changed in that I’ve 
considered things from the eyes of those boys.  They probably didn’t have much of a 
choice about whether they were involved in all of that shit.  So, I’ve started to look at 
things a bit more from 30,000 feet.  The world can be fucked and I don’t feel only pride 
or only shit for stuff I did over there.  Welcome to life I guess. 
Accounts from these participants suggest that continued changes to Service Members 
worldviews can allow for a larger/wider perspective that moves from only considering changes 
to conceptualizations of oneself or others/the world to a consideration of changes to both oneself 
and others/the world.   
Current considerations of (in)actions 
 The final question of the interview asked participants to summarize their current 
understandings and emotions concerning their (in)action(s).  All participoants noted that they had 
chosen the (in)action(s) they shared because they continued to experience some regret connected 
  
61 
 
to the (in)action.  Participants noted important differences, however, in how they currently 
experienced their regret.  Specifically, Service Members depicted two “types” of current regret:  
(1) “simple” regret or currently experiencing  primarily unpleasant emotions when considering 
the event as well as a belief that their (in)action(s) exemplify primary/key information about their 
identity; or (2) “complex” regret or currently experiencing both  unpleasant and pleasant 
emotions when considering the event and a recognition that the event was one among many 
events that had contributed to their identity.   
 An example of “simple” regret was expressed by Mike the Medic who couldn’t help 
(OPE-2), explained:  
I think about this event at least once every day.  I get angry and then I start to tear-up.  I 
think that others would tell me I’m a failure if I were to share this story.  Hell, I tell 
myself that I’m a failure.  I think that if I could have saved a few people and really 
contributed to the effort, I’d have that to look back on.  Instead, I don’t have anything to 
be proud about, then or now. 
Here, the Service Member notes that memories of the event only elicit unpleasant emotions (e.g., 
anger, sadness).  Moreover, this event appears to critically influence the Service Member’s 
analysis of their entire deployment experience while continuing to impact (negatively) the 
Service Members’ interpretations of their identity (e.g., this event proves that I’m no good). 
 An example of “complex” regret came from No shoot Ned (CO-3) who expressed regret 
over his failure to attack individuals climbing into a truck during a skirmish (he later saw these 
individuals firing at his fellow Service Members in a nearby unit):  
Oh man, I still think about it and it really gets my heart pumping.  Sometimes I don’t even 
know that I’m thinking about it until I notice that my jaw is clinching.  But I do recognize 
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that those guys didn’t want to be there anymore than I did.  It’s likely that they didn’t 
have a choice about whether they’d fight or not.  I feel bad for them, they were probably 
scared shitless.  War’s a complicated piece of shit.  If I could go back, I would shoot 
them.  But there’s a huge part of me that’s actually glad that I didn’t shoot them.  I’ll 
never know everything there is to know and so I go about the rest of my day. 
Though the Service Member acknowledges unpleasant emotions (e.g., anger) he also 
acknowledges feeling sympathy and even relief (e.g., both non-pleasant and pleasant emotions).  
Furthermore, he concedes that he has multiple, even contradictory, understandings and desires 
concerning his (in)actions.  Yet, rather than settling on one explanation or analysis of this event, 
he expresses an allowance for multiple insights, each offering a potential “piece” to his overall 
conceptualization of the event (also allowing for the possibility or probability that he’ll never 
have all of the pieces). 
“Trajectories” of change 
 In an attempt to conceptualize the rich mass of information from Study 2, we created 
time-ordered matrices of changes to Service Members’ interpretations (for an example, see 
Figure 3).  The matrices followed the flow of the interview, starting with participants’ 
interpretation of regret (also noting whether they regretted their (in)action and/or the result of 
their (in)action) and then noted participants’ perceptions of breaking their rules of right/wrong, 
interpretations of appropriateness (including whether they mentioned if they were protecting 
others), and their altered worldviews.  The right half of each matrix listed participants’ 
descriptions of changes to their interpretations (including whether they described currently 
experiencing complex or simple regret).    
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The time-line of changes to participants’ interpretations revealed interesting trends.  
Firstly, changes to participants interpretations did not appear to differ based on the type of 
(in)action they reported.  Further, current regret (whether complex or simple) appeared to only be 
associated with altered worldviews.  Whereas initial interpretations of breaking one’s rules of 
right/wrong and appropriateness did not change over time, only participants who noted that 
alterations to their worldview expanded (e.g., reported that they began to consider changes to 
their conceptualizations of themselves and others and the world) described complex regret. 
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
 
(In)actions 
We found that both acts of commission and omission are fairly common.  Using a clear 
and strict definition of (in)actions, we found that roughly half of our questionnaire sample 
reported at least one type of (in)action that resulted in substantial (e.g., a lot) and lasting harm to 
others.  Both acts of commission and omission also share some rather important consequences.  
Service Members’ descriptions of their (in)actions during interviews confirmed that both actions 
and inactions could result in serious outcomes (e.g., death, life-threatening injuries) to others. It 
is undoubtedly the case that the proportion of Service Members who report an (in)action will be 
influenced by the criteria used to define (in)action.  Thus, future research is needed to determine 
the prevalence of (in)action when it is defined less and more strictly. 
One of the most noteworthy findings from our investigation concerns the distinct 
characteristics of Commission-Physical actions.  Results from questionnaires and interviews 
suggest that Commission-Physical actions are most likely to occur in the context of a 
combat/operational incident.  Commission-Physical actions tended to occur when Service 
Members were doing their job or duty, protecting others, and contributing to the successful 
outcome of their unit’s mission (e.g., Greg the Gunner provided security for a convoy and used 
his weapon to ensure that everyone arrived at their destination safely).  Commission-Physical 
actions were also the only type of (in)action to solely describe substantial harm done to non-
Service Members (e.g., all narratives of Commission-Physical actions described harm to civilians 
or enemy combatants). 
Commission-Emotional actions and Omission-Emotion inactions shared very similar 
associations with psychological problems (e.g., they exhibited almost identical zero-order and 
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partial correlations with PTSD, dysphoria, and alcohol/substance use).   Correspondingly, 
interview participants who described (in)actions that resulted in emotional harm to others (e.g., 
Commission-Emotional, Omission-Emotional) only described harm to fellow Service Members.    
When compared to other types of (in)actions, participants who reported a Commission-
Emotional or Omission-Emotional (in)actions were less likely to report that their (in)action 
occurred during combat.  Relatedly, although a majority of questionnaire participants who 
reported a Commission-Emotional or Omission-Emotional (in)action also endorsed that they 
were doing their job or duty, interview participants clarified that, though they were doing their 
job, they believed that they had failed in their responsibilities to others.  For example, Henry who 
didn’t Help noted that, though he continued to do his job and show up to work every day, he did 
not help his supervisor even though he believed it was his responsibility to do so.        
Of the four types of (in)actions, Omission-Physical inactions were most strongly 
associated with psychological problems.  Only Omission-Physical inactions continued to predict 
all three psychological problems (PTSD, dysphoria, and alcohol/substance use) when age, 
gender, number of deployments, and combat/post combat experience were taken into account.  
Moreover, among questionnaire participants who reported Omission-Physical inactions, the 
majority reported that their inaction occurred during a combat incident and that they were doing 
their job or duty.  Similar to participants reporting Commission-Emotional or Omission-
Emotional (in)actions, however, interview participants who reported an Omission-Physical 
inaction clarified that, though they were doing their job in some ways, their inaction was a failure 
of their duty and responsibilities in other ways.  Also similar to (in)actions resulting in emotional 
harm to others, interview participants who described Omission-Physical inactions only depicted 
the impact of their inactions to fellow Service Members.  For example, Conner the Convoy 
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Commander reported that, while their inactions occurred while they were in the process of doing 
their job (i.e., commanding a convoy), their inactions reflected an inability to do fulfill other 
facets of their responsibility towards others (in both cases their inactions resulted in substantial 
harm to fellow Service Members).  
This study replicated the findings of the study by Williams and Berenbaum (in review) 
suggesting that both acts of commission and omission are important.  For example, when 
compared to acts of commission, only acts of omission continued to predict all three 
psychological problems (PTSD, dysphoria, alcohol/substance use) when taking into account age, 
gender, number of deployments and combat/post combat experiences.  These results further 
support prior research that has recommended that that assessments measuring moral injury would 
benefit from distinguishing between different kinds of experience (e.g., commission and 
omission) and the multiple interpretations that may contribute to Service Members judgments of 
regret (e.g., Frankfurt and Frazier, 2016).   
We considered an act of omission to occur when an individual failed to act to prevent 
harm to others when they believed they should have done so.  Thus, acts of omission, as we 
defined them, are a subset of other phenomena described in the literature, such as “witnessing 
violence” and “moral injury by others.” For example, Service members may witness some 
violent acts that they judged as appropriate or reasonable (e.g. witnessing a fellow unit member 
harm an enemy combatant to protect other members of his/her unit, which would be an example 
of “witnessing violence” but not an act of omission), and other witnessed acts may be interpreted 
as morally unjustified though the Service Member does not have the ability or opportunity to 
prevent harm to others (e.g., witnessing a superior officer harm an unarmed civilian, which we 
would consider “moral injury by others” but not an act of omission).  It will be important for 
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future research to separately examine the associations between psychological problems and each 
of these different types of witnessed acts.  Although we expect all forms of witnessed acts to be 
associated with psychological problems, we hypothesize that psychological problems will be 
most strongly associated with acts of omission (as we define them), next most strongly 
associated with “moral injury by others” (when the person did not believe they could have 
prevented the other person’s action), and least strongly associated with “witnessing violence” 
(when the violence is considered reasonable). 
Regret and Interpretations 
Another important finding from our investigation concerns regret more generally.  For 
example, our investigation revealed that Service Members interpret regret differently depending 
on the type of (in)action they reported.  Given the strong association between Omission-Physical 
inactions and psychological problems, it is not surprising that participants who reported an 
Omission-Physical inaction also reported the highest levels of regret.   Correspondingly, just as 
Commission-Emotional actions and Omission-Emotional inactions shared similar associations 
with psychological problems, they also shared similar levels of regret.  Our interviews revealed 
why these three types of (in)action were similar -- participants referred to fellow Service 
Members when discussing the harm to others associated with these three types of (in)action, but 
not when discussing Commission-Physical actions.  Thus, in addition to exploring actions and/or 
inactions that result in physical and/or emotional harm to others, future research should also 
explore whether regret differs based the nature of the relationship with the harmed individual 
(e.g., the harmed individual was my supervisor, the harmed individual was my subordinate).   
Commission-Physical actions were associated with less regret than were the other types 
of (in)action.  Yet, unlike the other types of (in)actions, the degree of regret seemed much more 
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relevant for Commission-Physical actions.  Whereas the association between non regretted 
Commission-Physical actions and psychological problems was the weakest of any type of 
(in)action, regretted Commission-Physical actions had much stronger (and in one case the 
strongest) association with psychological problems.   
Interview participants clarified that the criteria that Service Members use to determine 
regret associated with Commission-Physical actions is different from the criteria that Service 
Members use to determine regret associated with than other types of (in)actions.  For example, 
only participants who described Commission-Physical actions specified regretting their actions 
specifically (e.g., regretting shooting at young men) or regretting the outcome of their action 
specifically (e.g., regretting killing a civilian).  In contrast, for other types of (in)actions, 
participants did not clearly distinguish between regretting actions as opposed to outcomes. 
Service Members who described a Commission-Physical action were also the only participants 
who referred to the military’s rules of engagement (ROE) when explaining their perceptions of 
breaking their rules of right/wrong and their interpretations of the appropriateness of their 
actions.  Researchers have suggested that a defining feature of regret is whether an (in)action 
follows social norms (Feldman & Albarracin, 2017).  Since the ROE define acceptable and 
appropriate actions in a combat scenario, they offer a reference point for Service Members  to 
determine if their Commission-Physical actions (of which all participants described a combat 
scenario) conformed to the contextual social norms.  The capacity of the ROE to delineate 
whether an action was right and/or appropriate may, in part, explain the stark differences 
between Service Members’ regretted and non-regretted Commission-Physical actions. 
We found that protecting others was important.  Among participants who reported that 
they were protecting others, Service Members who reported greater appropriateness of their 
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(in)action tended to report lower levels of PTSD and dysphoria.   In contrast, among participants 
who did not report protecting others, there was no association between reported appropriateness 
and PTSD and dysphoria.  Among interview participants, we also found that those participants 
who described non-Commission-Physical (in)actions commonly stated that they viewed their 
(in)action(s) as a failure in their responsibilities to protect others.   
We also found that altered worldviews was the only interpretation variable that predicted 
elevated levels of all three psychological problems independently of the other interpretation 
variables (perceiving that one’s (in)action broke one’s rules of right/wrong and perceived 
appropriateness) when age, gender, number of deployments and combat/post combat experiences 
were considered.   When other factors were accounted for, altered worldviews also predicted 
psychological problems better than did guilt and shame.  Interview participants’ portrayal of 
changes to their worldviews revealed that the specific changes to Service Members’ worldviews 
depended on the type of (in)action they endorsed.  Specifically, acts of commission tended to be 
associated with changes in conceptualizations of others, whereas acts of omission tended to be 
associated with changed conceptualizations of oneself.  Though prior moral injury research has 
proposed that the experience of guilt and shame may be the fundamental pathological core of 
most combat-related PTSD cases (e.g., Wilson, Drozdek & Turkovic, 2006), our findings suggest 
that alterations to Service Members’ worldviews (associated with their wartime (in)actions) may 
be as important, if not more important, than guilt and shame in accounting for the psychological 
well-being of military personnel.  Moreover, whereas previous research has found associations 
between alterations to trauma survivors’ foundational assumptions about the world (e.g., the 
world is safe and predictable) and psychological problems (Park, Mills, & Edmondson, 2014), 
these are the first findings to suggest that different events (e.g., ones’ actions or inactions) can 
  
70 
 
lead to distinct changes to one’s worldview (e.g., changes to one’s conceptualization of oneself 
vs changes to one’s conceptualization of others/the world).  Future research is needed to 
determine whether alterations in views of one’s self are associated with different problems 
and/or difficulties than are alterations in views of others and the world.   
Implications 
 We consider moral injury to be: (1) an (in)action that; (2) leads to one’s belief that they 
broke their own rules or right/wrong and/or changes to their understanding of themselves, others, 
and the world which; (3) corresponds with unpleasant emotions (e.g, guilt/shame, sadness) and; 
(4) results in psychological problems.  Correspondingly, we consider moral injury to be a 
specific etiological pathway/mechanism to a variety of psychological problems including, but not 
limited to, PTSD and depression.  Given the cross-sectional nature of our data, future research is 
needed to confirm the specific pathway(s) of our proposed model of moral injury.  Future 
research is also necessary to consider alternative causal explanations.  For example, it may be 
that the distress caused by wartime experiences leads one to exaggerate or color their 
interpretations of their (in)actions.   
These findings also provide important information about the conceptualization of moral 
injury more generally.  Previously, researchers have proposed a model of moral injury comprised 
of two factors, perceived transgressions and perceived betrayal by others (“I feel betrayed by 
others I once trusted”, Nash et al., 2014). Our interviews with Service Members revealed no 
descriptions or narratives depicting betrayal by others.  Though betrayal by others is likely to 
contribute to psychological distress within the military population, we do not consider it to be a 
feature of moral injury.  Rather, the perception of betraying others was a common theme that 
emerged from our interviews and is likely a central feature of moral injury.  Thus, future research 
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and measures of moral injury will likely benefit from including Service Members’ perceptions of 
betraying others (particularly their fellow Service Members). 
 Moral injury also appears to be critically shaped by contextual factors that have largely 
been overlooked. We found that the type of MIEs explored by the majority of moral injury 
researchers to date (e.g., acts of commission resulting in physical harm to others) appear to often 
be interpreted differently by Service Members than other types of MIEs.  Our interviews 
revealed that, whereas judgements of Commission-Physical actions are often determined by a 
rules-based approach (e.g., according to one’s adherence to the military’s code of ethics/ROE), 
acts of omission are more-often grounded in attachment (e.g., Service Members’ relationships 
with each other).   Thus, whether Service Members perform a morally injurious action or an 
inaction appears to critically shape the psychological mechanisms that are associated with moral 
injury.  Most importantly, perhaps, the myriad differences that we identified between Service 
Members’ response and interpretations to actions compared to inactions (revealed both by our 
questionnaire study as well as through interviews) suggest that there may not merely be one 
“type” or “form” of moral injury.   
 Despite the complexity and multifaceted nature of moral injury, we do not believe that it 
should be considered as a distinct disorder (e.g., one need not have either moral injury or 
depression).  Rather, we consider our conceptualization of moral injury as offering a useful 
heuristic to explain potential obstacles to Service Members’ psychological well-being.  Indeed, 
certain common psychological problems within the military community will likely benefit from a 
better conceptualization of moral injury.  For example, a Service Member diagnosed with 
depression who is also experiencing moral injury may be experiencing significant distress and 
dysfunction due to changes to their worldviews (e.g., changed understanding of themselves) and 
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intense unpleasant emotions (e.g.) guilt/shame stemming from an event where they were 
responsible for the death of another person (e.g., see the narrative of Connor the Convoy 
Commander above).  In this scenario, common intervention techniques for depression, such as 
challenging the logic of the Service Member’s thoughts (e.g., Beck, 2011), may not be effective. 
The literature on traumatic grief may add further understanding to our conceptualization 
of moral injury.  First, research on traumatic grief has found that individuals who experience a 
traumatic loss (e.g., sudden and/or violent death) have an additional risk factor for more severe 
psychological reactions to loss (e.g., comorbid complicated grief, PTSD and depression) when 
compared to individuals who experience a loss by non-traumatic means (Papa, Neria, & Litz, 
2008).  We propose that moral injury is a similar risk factor. Service Members who have 
experienced a traumatic event while also engaging in a morally injurious (in)action may be more 
likely to experience different (and perhaps more problematic) psychological sequalae when 
compared to Service Members who have not engaged in morally injurious (in)actions.  Second, 
researchers have found that the loss of a close friend or family member predicts more difficulty 
than the loss of an acquaintance (Nolen-Hoeksema & Larson,1999).  Similarly, our interviews 
found that Service Members often expressed greater difficulty in interpreting and responding to 
(in)actions involving fellow Service Members than to (in)actions involving non-Service 
Members.   Additional research is needed to explore whether Service Members’ closeness with 
others involved in morally injurious (in)actions predicts greater severity of psychological 
problems.  Third, research has shown that survivors who suffer through a traumatic bereavement 
experience the additional burden of attempting to cope with the trauma and any resulting stress 
in addition to the death and the grieving process (Raphael and Martinek, 1997).  Similarly, we 
argue that Service Members who have engaged in a morally injurious (in)action may have an 
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additional burden of attempting to make meaning of (in)actions that violate their sense of right 
and wrong and/or result in alterations to their understanding of themselves/others/the world 
while also attempting to cope in the aftermath of a traumatic event.  Fourth, researchers have 
argued that the stress associated with a traumatic loss can interfere with the grieving process, 
leading to additional post-loss functional impairment (Stroebe, Schut, & Finkenauer, 2001).  
Likewise, Service Members’ attempts to understand and interpret morally injurious (in)actions 
may interfere with their attempt/ability to cope with the aftermath of a traumatic wartime event.  
Finally, traumatic grief research has warned against “overly pathologizing” the human response 
to loss (Neria & Litz, 2004).  Though individuals who suffer a traumatic loss may be more likely 
to experience additional psychological difficulties, more often than not, an individual’s 
difficulties and emotions stemming from loss are necessary and healthy expressions of a healing 
process.  Correspondingly, it is likely that the many of the emotions and difficulties associated 
with moral injury reflect a common/ordinary response to the complex nature of a wartime 
setting.  Like traumatic grief, however, we hope that our conceptualization of moral injury will 
add additional understanding to distress and dysfunction experienced by some who have served 
in the Armed Forces.  
Our results also offer valuable insight that may inform other interventions that are 
designed to address the psychological difficulties faced by many military Service Members.  
Interview participants’ descriptions of changes to their interpretations of their (in)actions over 
time may contribute to interventions that focus on changing Service Members’ beliefs and 
cognitions about wartime events (e.g., CPT, Resick, 2001).  Whereas all of our interview 
participants reported no changes to their belief/interpretations of breaking their rules of 
right/wrong and appropriateness, some participants noted important changes to their altered 
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worldviews.  Moreover, only participants who expressed continued changes to their worldviews 
(e.g., over time stared to consider changes to both their conceptualizations of themselves and 
others/the world) described complex regret.  Prior research has found that contextualization (e.g., 
to consider an event or situation with its larger multilayered setting) and positive affect (the two 
characteristics of complex regret) are both key contributors to psychological well-being and 
resilience (e.g., Ong et al, 2006).  Since altered worldviews are also closely associated with a 
loss of meaning (Park, 2010), meaning-making endeavors will also likely be valuable 
components within the intervention process.  Thus, when exploring altered worldviews with 
Service Members, treatments based on post-traumatic growth may have great potential for 
exploring and addressing the meanings and interpretations associated with regretted (in)actions 
given their focus on expanding one’s perception of: (a) oneself; (b) others (via increasing 
capacity for interpersonal relationships); and (c) the world (via a more fluid philosophy of life) 
(Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). 
The results from both the questionnaire and interview investigations may also shed light 
on the difficulties inherent in the reintegration process.  Researchers have reported that the most 
difficult aspect of their adjustment after returning from a deployment is reconnecting with those 
they return to (Sayers, 2011).  Relatedly, when asked whether they perceived that their (in)action 
broke their rules of right and wrong, our interviews revealed that some Service Members report 
difficulty with distinguishing between the rules of war and the rules they grew up with.  Indeed, 
interview participants noted that the acceptability of their wartime actions differs drastically 
depending on whether they apply the rules of war or the rules of the civilian community they 
return to.  Correspondingly, we found that an increase in questionnaire participants’ belief that 
they broke their own rules of right and wrong significantly increased all three psychological 
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problems among Service Members who also believed that their wartime (in)action was 
appropriate.  Interview participants added that the (at times) stark contrast between the rules they 
followed while deployed and the rules they return home to have created obstacles in 
communication with the non-Military individuals they return home to (e.g., “I could never share 
my experiences with my friends and family”).   
The process of connecting with others may be further complicated by altered worldviews.  
Indeed, another major finding of this study was changes to Service Members’ interpretations of 
their (in)actions.  Specifically, Service Members may be challenged to translate their altered 
worldviews (e.g., the world is not safe/unpredictable) to those who have not shared their 
experience and whose views and understandings may not have changed.  Judith Herman (1996) 
has noted that complex situations often confront the veterans with a “strange double bind,” 
where it seems to be both necessary to speak about what happened, and yet impossible to do so 
adequately.  A veteran’s effort to associate with a community will often present its own 
challenges and obstacles.  Thus, in addition to Service Members’ meaning making efforts, they 
must confront the huge gap that exists between the world of deployment, and the world around 
them, in which people seem to be doing everything possible to “move on.” 
The results of this study must be interpreted in the context of its limitations. First, though 
the demographics (e.g., gender, race, branch of service, number of deployments) of the 
questionnaire sample was representative of the military overall, the relatively small number of 
participants from some demographics (e.g., females) did not allow us to explore certain questions 
(e.g., whether male or female Service Members are more likely to report one type of (in)action).  
Thus, future studies will probably need to be more selective (e.g., over sampling female Service 
Members) to explore (in)actions and meanings/interpretations among populations that are 
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underrepresented in the military.  Second, though our interview sample provided a number of 
important insights, it was based on a small sample and cannot be generalized.  As a result, it will 
be important to replicate our findings using a larger sample that is more representative of the 
military population.  Third, the retrospective nature of this investigation may have resulted in 
recall bias.  Although this may have inflated the strength of the associations among variables, it 
is worth noting that we found different patterns of results for different variables (e.g., omission 
vs. commission), suggesting that the results cannot be accounted for by a general tendency to 
view all things positively or negatively.  Fourth, this study focused exclusively on OEF/OIF 
veterans.  As a result, our results may not generalize to all veterans.  Further, additional research 
is needed to focus on Service Members from other eras.  Similarly, the relevance of moral injury 
to other populations (e.g., police) and specializations (e.g., criminal justice) merits additional 
investigation. Despite its limitations, we believe that this investigation adds to our understanding 
of the experience of Service Members.  Despite its limitations, we believe that this investigation 
adds to our understanding of the diversity of Service Members’ wartime experiences and the 
complexity of the interpretations associated with their (in)actions.    
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TABLES 
 
Table 1 
Means and standard deviations of regret scores and proportions of 
endorsed characteristics/outcomes for each category of (in)action  
 Commission  Omission 
Physical Emotional  Physical Emotional 
Regret      
                   Mean 3.2 3.6  3.7 3.5 
                   SD 1.3 1.3  1.2 1.3 
Doing Duty      
                      % 85.7 80.4  83.8 76.2 
During Combat      
                      % 83.5 64.1  79.8 66.7 
Improved Success      
                      % 82.0 70.6  54.5 61.9 
 
Table 2 
Zero-order and partial correlation/Hierarchical regression analyses 
exploring associations between (in)actions and psychological problems 
 Zero-order Correlation 
Regression 
 Partial Correlation1  
Regression2 
Variable PTSD  
Dys- 
phoria  
Alcohol & 
Sub Use  PTSD  
Dys- 
phoria  
Alcohol & 
Sub Use 
Commission            
    Physical            
                r .24***  .17***  .16***  .03  .01  .04 
               β .10*  .04  .07  .02  .08  .08 
                    Emotional         
                    r .25***  .24***  .18***  .10*  .14**  .08* 
                   β .14**  .15**  .09  .09*  .12**  .06 
            Omission            
     Physical            
                     r .32***  .29***  .25***  .18***  .17***  .14** 
                    β .23***  .21***  .20***  .12**  .12**  .13** 
                   Emotional            
                    r .23***  .21***  .12*  .14**  .13**   .02 
                   β .13**  .13**  .04  .08*  .09*   .02 
1Removing shared variance with Age, Gender, # of Deployments and 
Combat/post-Combat experience 
2Step 1: Age, Gender, # of Deployments and Combat/post-Combat 
experience  
Step 2: Commission-Physical, Commission-Emotional, Omission-
Physical, Omission-Emotional 
*p < .05    **p < .01    ***p < .001 
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Table 3  
Summary of t tests comparing the means of psychological problems for 
regretted and not regretted (in)actions 
Variable 
PTSD  Dysphoria  
Alcohol/ 
Substance use 
M SD  t  M SD  t  M SD  t 
Commission                   
   Physical    4.58***     4.36***     1.25 
      No Regret 39.2 16.9    19.6 8.7    22.2 8.9   
      Regret 53.2 18.0    26.5 9.3    24.1 8.3   
               
   Emotional    1.25     2.14*     0.04 
      No Regret 43.3 19.2    22.0 9.4    23.2 8.2   
      Regret 47.1 17.3    25.4 9.6    23.3 7.4   
               Omission           
   Physical    0.18     0.80     1.01 
      No Regret 50.6 18.6    25.3 9.7    24.3 8.1   
      Regret 51.3 16.0    26.8 7.9    26.2 9.4   
               
   Emotional    0.79     1.31     0.85 
      No Regret 47.6 18.0    23.8 9.9    22.1 8.1   
      Regret 51.3 17.9    27.2 8.8    24.2 9.7   
*p < .05  ***p < .001 
 
 
Table 4 
Descriptive statistics and t-tests comparing interpretations, 
guilt/shame, and psychological problems for participants who did (n = 
256) and did not (n = 249) report an (in)action 
 
   No 
(In)action  (In)Action   
Variable  Range  M  SD  M  SD  t(503) 
Broke Rules  2.0 - 10.0  5.7  2.3  6.3  2.1  3.4** 
             Alt. Worldviews  6.0 - 30.0  14.4  5.0  18.0  5.4  7.9*** 
             Appropriateness  2.0 - 10.0  7.0  2.2  7.4  2.1  2.0 
             Guilt/Shame  5.0 - 25.0  13.6  4.2  15.9  4.2  5.9*** 
             PTSD  19.0 - 95.0  33.0  16.4  45.3  18.1  8.0*** 
             Dysphoria  10.0 - 50.0  17.9  9.0  23.6  9.4  6.9*** 
             Alcohol/Sub Use  14.0 - 51.0  19.8  6.1  22.9  7.6  5.0*** 
**p < .01    ***p < .001 
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Table 5 
Zero-order and partial correlations/Hierarchical regression analyses exploring 
associations between the meanings/interpretations variables and psychological 
problems 
  Zero-order Correlation 
Regression 
 Partial Correlation1  
Regression2 
Variable 
 
PTSD  
Dys- 
phoria  
Alcohol & 
Sub Use  PTSD  
Dys- 
phoria  
Alcohol & 
Sub Use 
Broke Rules             
                     r   .33***   .32***      .20***   .24***   .25***      .11* 
                    β    .05    .06      .06    .00    .02      .01 
             Alt. Worldviews          
                     r   .60***   .53***      .27**  .47***   .41***      .14** 
                    β   .53***   .44***      .19**  .38***   .34***      .11* 
             Appropriateness             
                     r    .02   -.03     -.03   -.09   -.07     -.08 
                    β    .08    .02      .01   -.02   -.04     -.06 
             Guilt/Shame             
                     r    .44***    .42***      .24***    .34***    .34***      .12** 
                β    .07    .09      .08    .05    .08      .06 
1Removing shared variance with Age, Gender, # of Deployments and 
Combat/post-Combat experience 
2Step 1: Age, Gender, # of Deployments and Combat/post Combat experience  
Step 2: Broke Rules, Altered Worldviews, Guilt/Shame, Appropriateness 
*p < .05    **p < .01    ***p < .001 
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FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Participant flowchart 
 
 
 
4 
Used the Same Responses Throughout  
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Figure 3-   
Hypothetical Example of a Time-Ordered Matrix for Altered Worldviews  
Type of (In)action:  Omission - Physical 
Time May, 2008  November, 2017 
Interpretation At Event Changes Since Event 
Regret Action – Yes 
Outcome - Yes 
Still Regret? Yes 
Type of Regret:  Complex 
Broke Rules Yes Yes 
Appropriate No 
Failed to 
protect others 
No 
Failed to Protect others 
Altered 
Worldviews 
-  Worldviews 
– self changed 
-“Wasn’t sure 
what to 
believe” 
-“Wasn’t sure 
if I was cut out 
to be in the 
military/a 
leader” 
- “Continued to doubt my beliefs”;  
- “Started to recognize that others were involved 
and that the situation was complicated” 
(Expanded Altered Worldviews ) 
- “Can’t share my experiences with others” 
- “My worldview is still changed and I’ve realized 
that I can help others (which is why I’m in 
college).” 
- “I still think I could have done better, but that’s 
life, I more than just that one thing.” 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Slopes Showing Moderation of Protecting Others on Association between Perceived 
Appropriateness and PTSD (left); Dysphoria (right) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
**p < .01 
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Figure 4 
Slopes showing moderation of perceived appropriateness on association between breaking 
rules of right/wrong and PTSD (left); dysphoria (right); Alcohol/Substance Use (bottom) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* p < .05 ***p < .001 
 
Perceived 
Appropriateness 
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